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INTRODUCTION
A fiduciary is someone with a certain form of discretion, power, or
authority over the legal and practical interests of a beneficiary.1 As a result
of this arrangement, the beneficiary is vulnerable to predation by the
fiduciary. Fiduciary relationships trigger a suite of duties, at the core of
which is the duty of loyalty. In a sense, the fiduciary relationship is oriented
around the possibilities of trust and betrayal. One point of fiduciary duties is
to prevent betrayal or, failing that, to assure that betrayals are rectified
insofar as possible. What constitutes loyalty or betrayal in fiduciary law,
however, is not always clear.
Consider Item Software (UK) Ltd. v. Fassihi.2 Messrs Fassihi and
Dehghani were corporate directors of a small software distribution company
called Item Software, whose main business was selling software developed
by Isograph. Dehghani was the managing director, and Fassihi was the sales
marketing director. In November 1998, Dehghani decided to renegotiate the
terms on which Item sold Isograph’s products. Fassihi urged Dehghani to
drive a hard bargain with Isograph, so Deghani negotiated aggressively.
Ultimately, the negotiations between Item and Isograph broke down, and
Isograph terminated its contract with Item.
Fassihi’s advice to Dehghani, although plausibly in Item’s best interest,
had the air of duplicity. Unbeknownst to Dehghani, during the negotiations
Fassihi had approached Isograph with a proposal to establish an independent
company to market Isograph’s products. At the same time Fassihi counseled
Dehghani to engage in brinksmanship, he also urged Isograph to terminate
its relationship with Item. In a subsequent lawsuit, Item alleged that Fassihi
only urged Dehghani to negotiate aggressively in order to increase the
prospects of undermining the negotiations and subsequently obtaining
Isograph’s business for himself.
1. See, e.g., Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, 136 (Can.) (“Relationships in which a fiduciary
obligation ha[s] been imposed seem to possess three general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope
for the exercise of some discretion or power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or
discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly
vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.”); United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (“A fiduciary relationship involves discretionary authority
and dependency. . . . [T]he beneficiary of the relation may entrust the fiduciary with custody over property
of one sort or another. Because the fiduciary obtains access to this property to serve the ends of the
fiduciary relationship, he becomes duty-bound not to appropriate the property for his own use.”); Paul
Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 261–62 (2011) (“In my view, a sound
definition of the fiduciary relationship [is that] a fiduciary relationship is one in which one party (the
fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).”)
(emphasis omitted).
2. Item Software (UK) Ltd. V. Fassihi [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244 (Eng.).
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Was Fassihi disloyal? The answer, of course, depends on what loyalty
means. It seems clear that Fassihi was disloyal to his partner in the ordinary
sense of that term. Fassihi’s conduct bears a striking resemblance to that of
Iago in Shakespeare’s Othello and of Littlefinger in George R.R. Martin’s A
Song of Ice and Fire novels, arguably the preeminent historical and
contemporary literary examples of treachery. Yet as a legal matter, whether
Fassihi violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty is not as obvious. This
discrepancy might be explained on the grounds that the notion of loyalty
applicable in life (let alone Elizabethan tragedy and genre fiction) differs
from the standard that leads to legal liability against fiduciaries like corporate
directors, trustees, and attorneys.
Cases like Fassihi implicate a lively scholarly debate concerning how
the legal notion of loyalty relates to the notion applicable outside the law.
Although the terms of this debate are not always clear, some see a deep
connection between the legal and non-legal notions of loyalty. Call this
position “moralism.” For the moralist, this connection to the moral or
ordinary notion of loyalty informs the legal requirements that apply to
fiduciaries, as well as the determination of whether a fiduciary has violated
duties to a beneficiary in any particular case. By contrast, a position we can
call “amoralism” denies that there is any meaningful connection between the
loyalty that applies to fiduciaries and its moral counterpart. To be sure, the
amoralist does not (and cannot) deny that judges sometimes invoke
moralized language to describe fiduciary concepts. However, for the
amoralist, any such connection is rhetorical flourish rather than real law. We
more fully describe the parameters of the debate between moralists and
amoralists in Part I.
The debate between moralists and amoralists is a species of a much
broader dispute about the comparative importance of legal materials and
broader normative principles in theorizing the private law. Consider the
connections between the morality of promise and the law of contract, or the
role the concepts of “wrong” and “duty” play in tort law. Much private law
litigation and scholarship concerns whether legal concepts resemble and
operationalize concepts from ordinary morality. Within fiduciary law, this
debate about loyalty has particularly important practical implications, since
it bears on how to elaborate standards in areas where fiduciary norms already
apply and on whether fiduciary norms should apply to a particular legal
domain in the first place.
The debate between moralists and amoralists is long running and
perhaps intractable. We propose to finesse, if not resolve, this impasse by
focusing on what we term the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty. On
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this view, whether someone satisfies the requirements of fiduciary loyalty
depends, at least in part, on how she deliberates and how her deliberation is
connected with her actions. Fiduciary loyalty also imposes demands on a
person’s commitments: a fiduciary does not satisfy her duty of loyalty
toward a person or cause if her commitments to that person or cause prove
themselves too flimsy. These standards apply to loyalty both inside and
outside of law. For the most part, they apply irrespective of whether the best
understanding of fiduciary loyalty is moralist or amoralist. We elaborate and
defend these claims in Part II, drawing on doctrines in corporate law, trust
law, agency law, bankruptcy law, and the law governing lawyers that are, we
argue, best explained by the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty.
Part III then clarifies our conclusions regarding cognitivism and
fiduciary loyalty, highlighting some of the implications of our analysis for
fiduciary law. Cognitivist accounts can catalyze both doctrinal and policy
innovations. Regardless of whether loyalty has an identical meaning inside
and outside of legal institutions, fiduciary loyalty, like ordinary loyalty,
imposes important standards on a fiduciary’s cognition. Appreciating this
structural feature of loyalty will enable judges and scholars to transcend
many debates about moralism and to resolve practical questions that do not
turn on whether moralism is true.
I. LOYALTY IN LAW
What is the best way to understand the fiduciary duty of loyalty? Is the
loyalty demanded of fiduciaries identical to or deeply connected with the
notion of loyalty applicable in the real world? Or is fiduciary loyalty a purely
juridical concept, one with no important connection to the concept as it
applies outside the law? Sections I.A and I.B describe an ongoing debate
between two positions that can (somewhat misleadingly) be called
“moralism” and “amoralism.” Section I.C explains why breaking the
impasse between moralism and amoralism is especially difficult and
identifies some practical consequences of this stalemate.
A. “MORALISM” ABOUT FIDUCIARY LOYALTY
The moralist position is that fiduciary loyalty references the notion of
loyalty that applies outside of legal institutions.3 A moralist view need not
3. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FIDUCIARY LAW 180, 181 (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith, eds., 2018) (noting that “moralist”
interpretations of fiduciary loyalty suggest that “fiduciary loyalty incorporates moral standards of loyalty
or that it expresses moral ideals of selflessness”); Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 261 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, eds.,
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contend that the legal and non-legal conceptions of loyalty are identical, only
that they have some deep connection. Moralism appears in debates about the
nature of fiduciary law,4 as well as in debates about substantive areas of law
that are oriented around fiduciary duties.5 We follow the convention in
describing this position as moralist, although the term itself is something of
a misnomer.6 A more accurate description would be that the legal notion of
loyalty is substantially connected to the non-institutional (that is, the
“ordinary” or “genuine”)7 notion of loyalty.
Moralism raises a number of important questions about the nature of
loyalty. A moralist need not resolve all of these general questions in order to
analyze fiduciary loyalty. Nor need the moralist accept that every aspect of
2014) (“Fiduciary duties are expressed in moral language of exacting honor, which is treasured by some
as the essence of the area and as a flowery show by others. The moralists see in fiduciary law a fixed and
mandatory system . . . .”); Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing our Money: The Law of Financial
Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra,
at 91, 103 (describing as “moralist” accounts of fiduciary loyalty that beneficiaries “are owed the highest
degree of altruism” and/or that fiduciary law “should be particularly concerned with motives in the
context of fiduciary relationships”).
4. Examples of moralism about fiduciary law might include Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary
Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 15–17 (2000); Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not
Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 338 (1999) (“Fiduciary relationships are not creatures only of law and
lawyers. Fiduciary relationships and fiduciary duties reflect the precepts of social morality and practice.”);
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 829–30 (1983) (“Courts regulate fiduciaries by
imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an important part of fiduciary law.
Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabulary.”); Matthew Harding, Trust and Fiduciary
Law, 33 OXFORD. J. LEGAL STUDS. 81, 82 (2013) (arguing that “moral duties referring to trust play a role
in the justification of fiduciary duties”); Irit Samet, Fiduciary Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 126 (“By importing the loaded
concept of loyalty from ethics and sociology, equity endeavors to encapsulate a subtle and complex aspect
of the fiduciary relationship.”); Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged To Be Selfless?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 142 (“[T]here is a legal requirement of loyalty, which
is found in the positive law of fiduciary obligations and which is consistent with the requirements of the
law’s philosophical foundations.”).
5. Examples of scholarship that incorporate direct connections to moral concepts include Lyman
Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 47–
55 (2003) and Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 655 (2010). The most prominent example in the field of legal ethics
is Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060 (1975). Recent examples of trust law moralism include Melanie Leslie, Trusting Trustees:
Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005) and Lee-Ford Tritt, The
Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579 (2010).
6. To call this position moralist is to beg important questions about the moral or normative
significance of loyalty in the first place. See SIMON KELLER, THE LIMITS OF LOYALTY (2007). As noted
below, someone might adopt the moralist position about fiduciary loyalty while denying that loyalty has
specific hallmarks of moral significance—for example, the capacity to change what someone is morally
permitted or required to do.
7. Andrew Gold, Interpreting Fiduciary Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 3, at 37–38 [hereinafter Gold, Interpreting].
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“ordinary” or “genuine” morality is automatically incorporated into
fiduciary loyalty. Variants of moralism might well differ over which
dimensions of ordinary morality are implicated in fiduciary law.
Moralism has a long history in fiduciary law. In the United States, the
most prominent example of, and citation for, moralism is Justice Cardozo’s
opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon.8 The court there affirmed a lower court’s
holding that Salmon breached a fiduciary duty to Meinhard, his coparticipant in a joint venture for managing and leasing a building. Salmon
failed to disclose to Meinhard a re-leasing opportunity that rightfully
belonged to the joint venture. In finding that Salmon had breached his
fiduciary duty, Justice Cardozo wrote that
[j]oint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.
As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions. Only thus has the level
of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by
the crowd.9

The language of Meinhard is the high-water mark of moralism about
fiduciary loyalty. The case contemplates a standard for fiduciaries that
invokes (and may exceed) the requirements of moral loyalty and honor. To
be sure, the standard that Cardozo’s rhetoric describes was not and is not the
general legal definition of fiduciary loyalty, nor has it been incorporated into
partnership law in particular.10 However, a moralist might contend that the
rhetoric of Meinhard and similar cases indicates that fiduciary loyalty tracks
ordinary or genuine loyalty.
Moralism is also implicated, either expressly or implicitly, in many
other judicial opinions in a variety of jurisdictions and legal contexts. Courts
8. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
9. Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).
10. For example, sections 103(b) and 404(e) of the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) indicate that
conflicted transactions can be authorized by a vote of partners and that a partner’s benefitting from
conduct is not, per se, a violation of fiduciary duty. Elsewhere, the UPA specifically denies that the
standards applicable to trustees are applicable to partners. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 404, cmt. 5.
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sometimes resemble Meinhard in embracing moralism explicitly.11 Other
courts embrace moralism implicitly by invoking moralized concepts like
“utmost good faith” and “fidelity”12 or appealing to commonsense moral
precepts13 to resolve questions of fiduciary law.
Many academic commentators deploy moralism as a descriptive or
interpretive claim, a way of explaining how moral precepts matter for
understanding what fiduciary law is. As part of this interpretive task,
ordinary moral notions might be held to illuminate a number of features of
fiduciary law. For example, a moralist might see moral precepts as
elucidating the point of fiduciary duties—that is, why non-fiduciary
mechanisms of accountability are insufficient for fiduciary relationships, and
what special features explain the grounds of fiduciary duties. Ordinary moral
precepts might also be thought to illuminate the content of fiduciary duties,
not only explaining widely recognized dimensions of fiduciary duties (such
as the prohibitions on a fiduciary’s conflicts of interest or profiting from the
relationship), but also explaining the standards of conduct that apply to
fiduciaries. A moralist could also invoke ordinary moral notions in order to
explain the standards of liability that apply to fiduciaries, including the
criteria for determining when fiduciary duties have been violated.
11. See, e.g., In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1994) (“The conduct of attorneys is
not measured by how close to the edge of thin ice they skate. The measure of an attorney’s conduct is not
how much clarity can be squeezed out of the strict letter of the law, but how much honor can be poured
into the generous spirit of lawyer-client relationships.”); Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton &
Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1283 (Pa. 1992) (“There are few of the business relations of life involving a
higher trust and confidence than those of attorney and client . . . [and] few governed by sterner principles
of morality and justice.” (quoting Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 232, 247 (1850))); Darby v.
Furman Co., 513 S.E.2d 848, 849 (S.C. 1999) (“Real estate agents occupy a fiduciary relationship with
their clients and are under a legal obligation as well as a high moral duty to give loyal service to the
principal.”); Owen v. Shelton, 277 S.E.2d 189, 192 (Va. 1981) (finding that fiduciary duties “illustrate[]
the high regard the law holds for the fiduciary relationship, founded as it is upon one man’s trust in the
integrity and fidelity of another”); Zastrow v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 60 (Wis. 2006)
(“A breach of the duty of loyalty imports something different from mere incompetence; it connotes
disloyalty or infidelity.” (internal citations omitted)).
12. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 112.01(c) (2018) (“A thing is done ‘in good faith’ within the meaning of
this section, when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or not.”); Daugherty v.
Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. 1978) (“Since the relationship of attorney-client is one fiduciary in
nature, the attorney has the duty to exercise in all his relationships with this client-principal the most
scrupulous honor, good faith and fidelity to his client’s interest.”). Lusina Ho summarizes developments
in English company law as elevating “good faith” from “an exonerating circumstance in specific contexts
to a general duty.” Lusina Ho, Good Faith and Fiduciary Duty in English Law, 4 J. EQUITY 19, 21 (2010).
13. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003) (“[E]lementary trust
law . . . confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may
not allow it to fall into ruin on his watch.”); United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“A lawyer’s duty to avoid conflict of interests arises from agency law. The
ancient principle is that ‘no man can serve two masters.’ Matthew 6:24.”).
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Furthermore, moralism might be thought to explain the remedies for
violating fiduciary duties, including the determination of which remedies are
justified for fiduciary breaches as such and which remedies are appropriate
in any particular case. To be sure, a moralist need not contend that ordinary
morality supplies answers to all of these questions or answers any of them
completely. Rather, if moralism is correct, then legal actors can (or should
be able to) appeal directly to at least some aspects of ordinary morality in
debates about at least some legal questions related to fiduciary law.
However, moralism may extend beyond descriptive and interpretive
claims into purely normative terrain. Moralists have offered a variety of
justifications for the incorporation of ordinary moral precepts into fiduciary
law. For example, Tamar Frankel sees moralism as “exert[ing] pressure on
the fiduciary to fulfill his obligations once he has agreed to enter into the
[fiduciary] relation” and “elevating the purpose for which the fiduciary’s
power is granted to a position of priority over other values which may guide
the fiduciary.”14 Another prominent justification for moralism is more
instrumental: fiduciary law’s incorporation of moral notions might be
defended as promoting better behavior by fiduciaries.15 Or, perhaps, morality
supplies the grounding or justification for the juridical relational duties
within fiduciary law, exerting a gravitational pull on fiduciary law in
marginal cases even if most of the development of fiduciary law is mainly
driven by institutional, rather than moral, considerations.
Moralism, then, can be framed as both a descriptive and a normative
thesis. The descriptive thesis is that moral (or other non-institutional)
considerations are deeply connected to understanding what fiduciary law is,
and especially to understanding fiduciary loyalty. The normative thesis is
that there are good reasons for this arrangement.

14. Frankel, supra note 4, at 831.
15. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Must Salmon Love Meinhard? Agape and Partnership
Fiduciary Duties, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 257, 270 (2014) (contending that moralized rhetoric of fiduciary
law has instrumental value because, “[p]artners who love one another can trust one another. In turn,
partners who trust one another will expend considerably less time and effort – and thus incur much lower
costs – monitoring one another.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1696 (1990) (“The language expressing [fiduciary] norms is
aspirational and studiously imprecise. The very ambiguity of the language conveys its moral content as
the court’s refusal to set lines is designed to discourage marginal conduct by making it difficult for a
fiduciary to determine the point at which self-serving conduct will be prohibited, and thus to encourage
conduct well within the borders.”).
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B. “AMORALISM” ABOUT FIDUCIARY LOYALTY
Many judges and commentators on fiduciary law reject moralism. The
common element of such amoralist views is a denial that fiduciary law
makes reference to ordinary moral precepts or tracks in any deep way
concepts from moral life. In particular, the amoralist contends that the
ordinary understanding of loyalty cannot explain fiduciary relationships or
the content of fiduciary duties in more than a superficial way. As Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel put it, “[f]iduciary duties are not special
duties; they have no moral footing . . . .”16 The amoralist might also deny
that ordinary moral notions are relevant to important legal questions, for
example when a fiduciary duty has been violated or what remedies should
be available for such a violation. The amoralist would contend that the
standards applicable to fiduciaries in, say, Delaware Chancery Court or a bar
disciplinary hearing can differ wildly from (and contradict) the standards
used in the evaluation of soldiers, friends, or literary characters.
Judges and commentators have espoused many varieties of amoralism.
Some commentators deny moralism on empirical grounds. This empiricist
position bases its conclusions on evidence that courts eschew or reject
moralized notions in actually deciding fiduciary law cases. For example, the
empiricist might point to Lord Herschell’s opinion in Bray v. Ford, which
explicitly rejects a moralized understanding of fiduciary loyalty:
It is an inflexible rule of the Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary
position . . . is not, unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make
a profit; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest
and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been
said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on the
consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is danger, in such
circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by
interest rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was
bound to protect. It has, therefore, been deemed expedient to lay down this
positive rule.17

This empirical strategy might deploy an inductive methodology of legal
theorizing.18 Furthermore, because decisions in fiduciary law routinely
16. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425,
427 (1993).
17. Bray v. Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL) 51 (Lord Herschell) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also Market
St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding the duty of good faith in
carrying out a contract “is, as it were, halfway between a fiduciary duty (the duty of utmost good faith)
and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud. Despite its moralistic overtones it is no more the injection
of moral principles into contract law than the fiduciary concept itself is”).
18. Gold, Interpreting, supra note 7, at 38–42 (citing, inter alia, William Lucy, Method and Fit:
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utilize moralized language and invoke “ordinary” understandings of loyalty,
the empiricist needs to provide an explanation for why this language does
not capture anything essential about fiduciary law. Perhaps, an empiricist
might argue, the moralized rhetoric of fiduciary law opinions should be
subordinated to assessments of how judges actually resolve particular cases,
rather than the language in which they announce their resolutions.19
Few, if any, argue for amoralism solely on empirical grounds. Rather,
most amoralists offer principled justifications for an amoralist understanding
of fiduciary loyalty. One such principled version of amoralism is
“pluralism.”20 Many commentators have noted the wide variation in how
fiduciary duties are formulated across legal contexts.21 For example, the
standards for determining whether an attorney has lived up to her fiduciary
duties are different from the standards applicable to trustees or corporate
directors.22 Some pluralist approaches extend this insight to deny that any
non-trivial propositions about fiduciary loyalty generalize across fiduciary
contexts.23 Others are willing to specify a core of fiduciary loyalty, but insist
that this core must be very thin in order to apply across types of fiduciary
relationships.24
Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 605 (2007)).
19. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 429 (“[W]e seek knowledge of when
fiduciary duties arise and what form they take, not a theory of rhetoric—a theory of what judges do, not
of explanations they give.”).
20. See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of
Ownership, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3, at 339, 341; Andrew
Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note
3, at 176, 192 [hereinafter Gold, Loyalties].
21. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43,
49n.16 (2008) (explaining that fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and obedience “vary in their particular
content and contours among various kinds of fiduciary relationships”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Although one can identify
common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply with greater or lesser force in
different contexts involving different types of parties and relationships.”).
22. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 432.
23. See, e.g., Gold, Loyalties, supra note 20, at 193–94 (“Loyalty duties are an essential feature of
fiduciary relationships, but no specific conception of loyalty appears to carry the day. . . . [P]erhaps part
of what is special about fiduciary law is that it requires different kinds of loyalty for different kinds of
relationship[s]. Loyalty varies in our social experiences—it also varies in the law.”). Stronger and weaker
versions of the pluralist position are possible. On the weaker version, certain aspects of fiduciary norms
(for example, the standards for living up to the duty of loyalty or the implications of violating the duty of
loyalty) differ across jurisdictions or domains of law, while others (for example, the overall justification
for fiduciary duties and the remedies available to beneficiaries for violations by fiduciaries) might
overlap. On a stronger version of pluralism, no aspects of fiduciary norms necessarily generalize across
legal contexts.
24. E.g., Hanoch Dagan, Fiduciary Law and Pluralism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY
LAW (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., forthcoming 2019).
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Pluralist positions about fiduciary loyalty often import a dose of
empiricism. Gold, for example, argues that the non-generalizability of
fiduciary norms turns on the empirical proposition that at least some courts
in some fiduciary contexts reject a moralized understanding of loyalty. Gold
focuses on the case of Jordan v. Duff & Phelps,25 in which a majority opinion
(written by Judge Frank Easterbrook) deployed a hypothetical bargaining
methodology to conclude that fiduciary duties were owed to an employee of
a closely held corporation who owned shares in the firm. The Court found
that these duties were violated when the corporation failed to disclose
information about an upcoming merger prior to the employee’s resigning to
take a position at another firm and selling back his shares. A dissenting
opinion by Judge Richard Posner deployed the same methodology to reach
the opposite result.26 Gold argues that, while moral precepts might play some
explanatory or justificatory role in some legal contexts, other jurisdictions
and areas of fiduciary law do not invoke moralized explanations of fiduciary
concepts.27 Moreover, pluralism suggests that insights from one fiduciary
context have no intrinsic force across contexts (for example, to different
domains of fiduciary law within the same jurisdiction, as well as to the same
domain of fiduciary law across jurisdictions). Pluralism might also rule out
criticizing particular areas of fiduciary law jurisprudence (for example,
Delaware corporate law) on the grounds that it deviates from the “essence”
or “core” of fiduciary law. An extreme version of pluralism holds that that
there is no essence or core of fiduciary loyalty.28
Another amoralist approach is an argument from incompatibilism. The
incompatibilist contends that certain aspects of “moral” or “ordinary” loyalty
render these ideas inapplicable to fiduciary law and prevent them from being
legitimately imposed by legal institutions.29 In light of these aberrant
25. Jordon v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987).
26. Gold, Interpreting, supra note 7, at 39–42. Gold observes that a variety of other judicial
opinions, “perhaps most notably . . . Delaware corporate law,” also employ hypothetical bargaining
analysis. Id. at 41.
27. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“For every case in fiduciary law that applies an efficiency-focused,
hypothetical bargain approach to ascertaining fiduciary duties, there is another case that applies a morally
resonant, deontological alternative.”).
28. A weaker form of pluralism—which acknowledges a thin core—might allow that core to crossreference moral norms. Since our definition of moralism requires a deeper connection of fiduciary law to
ordinary loyalty, it is likely that even such a weak pluralism would be amoralist on our terms. Not much,
however, turns on this classification.
29. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law Without Loyalty, in
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 213 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2017); J.E.
Penner, Is Loyalty a Virtue, and Even If It Is, Does It Really Help Explain Fiduciary Liability?, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, 159 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller ed., 2014);
Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570 (2013); Miller, supra note 3. One
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elements, the legal definition of fiduciary loyalty does not and should not
incorporate the moral definition of loyalty. Incompatibilism is rooted in both
a specific understanding of the purposes of fiduciary law and a liberal
account of the limits of state power. For the incompatibilist, many aspects of
“ordinary” loyalty are irrelevant to the law and, in any case, inappropriate to
enforce. For example, an incompatibilist might contend that “ordinary”
loyalty has an affective dimension: someone is only loyal to another person
or a cause if she is disposed to have appropriate emotional responses based
on how the object of her loyalty fares.30 However, legal obligations
(including those imposed as part of fiduciary law) do not and should not turn
on considerations related to the manifestation of emotion or affect.
Determining whether someone has lived up to a legal duty should be a
question of how he acted, not what he felt. Indeed, it would be illegitimate
for legal institutions to impose duties on people to feel certain ways.31 How
someone feels while discharging his fiduciary responsibilities is irrelevant to
the most important normative question of fiduciary law, namely whether he
actually abused his power while doing so. Thus, fiduciary loyalty diverges
from “ordinary” loyalty in that the affective dimension that ex hypothesi
characterizes the latter is inapplicable to the former. The incompatibilist
argues for amoralism on the grounds that the moral notion of loyalty does
not fit well within legal institutions generally, and within the various
domains of fiduciary law specifically.
Another strain of amoralism, which we have previously called
“proscriptivism,” asserts that fiduciary loyalty can be fully described in
terms of the prohibitions (in particular, the no-profit and no-conflict rules)
that apply to fiduciaries.32 For the proscriptivist, fiduciary obligations do not
common element among all of these views is that crucial structural features inherent in fiduciary
relationships are not necessarily realized in non-legal relationships, and vice versa.
30. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 29, at 161–62. This incompatibilist logic might be extended to a
variety of other dimensions of “moral” or “ordinary” loyalty, such as the concern with devotion or
motivation. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty
and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926 (2006) (“Loyalty for the law’s purposes, unlike
Josiah Royce’s, does not mandate an all-embracing “thoroughgoing devotion” to the beneficiary of a
fiduciary duty. Its demands neither disregard for the autonomy of an actor subject to fiduciary duties nor
require an all-encompassing subordination of the actor’s interests to those of the beneficiary. Instead,
within the scope of their relationship, the fiduciary duty of loyalty proscribes self-dealing by the actor
and other forms of self-advantaging conduct without the beneficiary’s consent.”); Miller, supra note 3, at
20 (“Notwithstanding the moralizing rhetoric of judges in select fiduciary cases, the law rarely, if ever,
requires of fiduciaries the kind of devotion that we expect of persons with moral loyalties.”).
31. Alternatively, the incompatibilist might contend that these requirements are self-defeating
when they are backed by the threat of legal sanction. See discussion infra Section III.C (exploring this
argument from self-defeat at greater length).
32. See Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, Intentions, Compliance, and Fiduciary Obligations,
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require or prescribe any particular way of acting or deliberating. So long as
the fiduciary avoids behaving in ways that violate these proscriptions, she
has lived up to her fiduciary duties. Proscriptivism might be defended on
empirical grounds (for example, that courts sometimes formulate fiduciary
duties entirely in terms of proscriptions),33 on normative grounds,34 or on
both.35 The proscriptivist typically draws a clear distinction between
fiduciary duties (which are solely a function of the fiduciary relationship)
and “nominate” duties (which apply to both fiduciary and non-fiduciary
relationships).36 Although these nominate responsibilities might apply to the
fiduciary in virtue of her fiduciary relationship, they are not core aspects of
fiduciary loyalty because they do not apply uniquely to fiduciary
relationships.
Several principled arguments might be offered on behalf of the
proscriptivist position. For example, proscriptivism’s narrow reading of
fiduciary loyalty ensures non-interference by the state, where interference
might undermine the development of mutual trust between the fiduciary and
beneficiary. Another argument for proscriptivism could be based on
effectiveness: imposing narrow constraints on the fiduciary’s actions
empowers her to exercise her discretionary power on the beneficiary’s behalf
and avoid risk-aversion that would be counterproductive to advancing the
interests of the beneficiary. Proscriptivism might also be justified noninstrumentally, on grounds of autonomy: limiting fiduciary duties to the noprofit and no-conflict duties prevents the state from violating the sanctity of
an ongoing fiduciary relationship.
Proscriptivism’s narrow notion of fiduciary loyalty evokes Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s figure of the “bad man.”37 Holmes’s bad man is
rational, self-interested, and cynical. He is only motivated to conform to the
20 LEGAL THEORY 106, 129 (2014). Examples of proscriptivism include Matthew Conaglen, The Nature
and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 LAW Q. REV. 452 (2005); Robert Flannigan, The Core Nature of
Fiduciary Accountability, 2009 N.Z. L. REV. 375; Darryn Jensen, Prescription and Proscription in
Fiduciary Obligations, 21 KING’S L.J. 333 (2010); and Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91
B.U. L. REV. 899 (2011). Other views adopt a proscriptivist understanding of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,
but not of the (arguably) fiduciary duty of care. See generally, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic
Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197 (Andrew S. Gold
& Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
33. See generally, e.g., MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE
PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES (2011); Jensen, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 32, at 903–06.
35. See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note 32 passim.
36. See, e.g., CONAGLEN, supra note 33. Darryn Jensen draws a similar distinction between
fiduciary obligations and “logically prior” responsibilities, which are not essentially fiduciary. Jensen,
supra note 32, at 336.
37. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).

82

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:69

law in order to avoid negative consequences that might arise from nonconformity.38 As such, the Holmesian bad man sees potential legal sanctions
as the most important aspect of law; only when the costs of non-conformity
with a legal directive are higher than those associated with conformity can
the bad man be expected to conform. Many theorists contend that a primary
goal of law is to speak to the bad man.39 On this approach, the clarity of a
legal standard and the certainty with which it will be enforced are important
questions because they would matter to the bad man’s calculations. Fiduciary
law, with its moralistic rhetoric and open-ended responsibilities, might seem
a difficult language in which to communicate with the bad man. However,
this problem is avoided if the vagueness of fiduciary jurisprudence can be
formulated more precisely. The proscriptivist offers exactly this
precisification: the bad man can know exactly what behavior is expected of
him (for example, “do not engage in a conflicted transaction” and “do not
derive inappropriate profits from your work as a fiduciary”) and what will
happen if his behavior deviates from this expectation. Proscriptivism, then,
is fiduciary loyalty for the bad man.
A final type of argument for amoralism, prominent among legal
economists, is “contractarianism.”40 Contractarians contend that fiduciary
loyalty should be understood as a species of contractual obligations, since
both types of obligations typically arise from voluntary interactions. The
version of contractarianism most relevant to amoralism sees fiduciary duties
in terms of hypothetical bargaining: the standards that should apply to
fiduciaries are those that would arise as part of an ideal negotiation between
the fiduciary and the beneficiary.41 Many in the law-and-economics tradition
who advocate for contractarianism also contend that behavior is the
fundamental unit of analysis relevant to legal norms42 and that contractual
38. Id. (construing the bad man as caring “only for the material consequences which . . . knowledge
[of the law] enables him to predict”).
39. See YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO
REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR (2018); Hanoch Dagan, Between Rationality and Benevolence: The Happy
Ambivalence of Law and Legal Theory, 62 ALA. L. REV. 191, 191 (2010); Rebecca Stone, Legal Design
for the “Good Man”, 102 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1767 (2016).
40. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to
the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 passim (1990); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at
424; James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 L.Q. REV. 324, 326 n.173 (2010); John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 (1995).
41. See Kelli Alces, The Fiduciary Gap, 40 IOWA J. CORP. L. 351, 375 (2015) (“To determine the
hypothetical bargain, we must reach a conclusion about what the parties would have agreed given their
requirements and expectations of the relationship.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 431; Larry
Ribstein, Fiduciary Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 541 (1997).
42. See Stephen R. Galoob & Adam Hill, Norms, Attitudes and Compliance, 50 TULSA L. REV.
613, 622–26 (2015) (summarizing “reductive behaviorism” that characterizes law-and-economics
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performance is ultimately a function of behavior.43 Therefore, many
contractarians also embrace the idea that fiduciary obligations ultimately
concern a fiduciary’s behavior: the duty of loyalty requires a fiduciary either
to behave in specific ways or else to pay damages.44
As noted above, the contractarian position might be defended on
empirical grounds, as some courts rationalize their fiduciary law decisions
in contractarian language.45 However, the most powerful normative
argument for the contractarian approach is based on efficiency. For the
contractarian, fiduciary duties arise as a response to legal relationships in
which the agent is vested with discretionary power to act on behalf of the
principal. This arrangement creates high agency costs and raises the prospect
that (1) the agent might exercise power to benefit the agent and not the
principal; and (2) alternative mechanisms of monitoring the agent’s actions
will be unavailable.46 In these contexts, fiduciary duties deter the principal
from misconduct and opportunism. On the contractarian paradigm, the
fiduciary duty of loyalty (which prohibits the agent’s opportunistic behavior
and requires action in the interest of the principal) also has a disclosure
effect: it “induce[s] the fiduciary to avoid . . . conflict[s of interest] or to
disclose the material facts of how [such conflicts] might compromise the
fiduciary’s judgment.”47 The fiduciary duty of care, by contrast, applies a
loose but objective standard for assessing the agent’s work on behalf of the
principal.48 The duties of loyalty and care together provide broad standards
understanding of social and legal norms).
43. Richard McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1573, 1576 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (defining norms as
“behavioral regularities supported at least in part by normative attitudes” and conventions as “behavioral
regularities that lack such normative attitudes”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, A World Apart? An Essay on the
Autonomy of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 747, 751 (1998) (“[A]n operative legal norm characterizes the
behavior to which legal sanctions will attach.”).
44. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 41, at 353 (“That duty of loyalty to the other party guides courts in
deciding what the parties would have agreed about how the fiduciary should behave in unanticipated
circumstances.”); Langbein, supra note 40, at 658 (“Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary
law, embody the default regime that the parties to the trust deal would choose as the criteria for regulating
the trustee’s behavior in these settings in which it is impractical to foresee precise circumstances and to
specify more exact terms.”).
45. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987).
46. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character
and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046–49 (1991).
47. Sitkoff, supra note 32, at 201.
48. Id. at 202. To assess the fiduciary’s satisfaction of the duty of care solely in “objective” terms
is to presuppose behaviorism in several ways. Due to their relative ease of monitoring, behavioral
considerations are the most relevant to reducing agency costs. Further, the modal beneficiary can be
expected to care ex ante about the fiduciary’s behavior, especially given a prior methodological
assumption that the beneficiary is agnostic between the fiduciary’s performing or paying damages.
Moreover, given the possibility of contracting around default terms, a contractarian account can deny any
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for the functioning of an efficient fiduciary relationship. Gaps in the
application of the standards can be filled in by subsidiary doctrinal rules49
and, if necessary, judicial interpretation, which should be oriented around
the question of what the fiduciary and beneficiary would have agreed to ex
ante as part of a hypothetical bargaining process.50
The contractarian position, then, provides a unified explanation of why
fiduciary duties matter (namely, to reduce agency costs by deterring agential
misconduct, while enabling agents to exercise discretionary authority), the
content of fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, and the character of remedies
for breach of fiduciary duties (which are broad and prophylactic in order to
effectively deter misconduct in the wake of monitoring problems). The
position is amoralist because the moral or “ordinary” notion of loyalty plays
no meaningful role in any part in this contractarian story.
The above list does not exhaust the possible versions of amoralism. Nor
are these types of amoralism mutually exclusive. For example, some
commentators combine the contractarian and proscriptivist positions.51 The
unifying theme is that some amoralists would deny that moral precepts are
generally or uniformly relevant to understanding fiduciary loyalty, while
others would deny that they should be relevant, and still others would deny
both propositions.
C. BREAKING THE IMPASSE?
How does and should fiduciary law incorporate the “moral” or
“ordinary” understanding of loyalty? Is fiduciary loyalty merely a technical
term, applicable only within legal institutions? The divide between moralists
and amoralists regarding fiduciary loyalty resembles similar divides in other
areas of law over the connection between moral and legal concepts. For
example, scholars of tort and criminal law debate whether the notion of
causation at issue in law is identical to the metaphysical notion of
causation.52 Similarly, debates about the interpretation of the Eighth
inherent problems with presuming an objective standard. If a beneficiary has strong preferences regarding
the fiduciary’s cognition, then the parties could bargain for adoption of a more subjective standard.
49. Id. at 202–03.
50. Alces, supra note 41, at 356.
51. See, e.g., Butler & Ribstein, supra note 40, at 71–72.
52. Compare MICHAEL MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS
AND METAPHYSICS 5 (2010) (“It is better to think that ‘cause’ is univocal; it means the same thing in
contexts of attributing responsibility as in contexts of explanation: it refers to a natural relation that holds
between events or states of affairs. . . . [W]hat criminal law and the law of torts mean by ‘cause’ is what
we ordinarily mean by ‘cause’ as we explain the world, viz some kind of natural relation.”), with Jane
Stapleton, An ‘Extended But-For’ Test for the Causal Relation in the Law of Obligations, 35 OXFORD J.
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Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment turn on
whether “cruelty” should be understood commonsensically or, alternatively,
in a more technical way.53 Perhaps the closest cousin to the debate between
moralists and amoralists occurs in contract law, where some scholars
contend that there is a deep connection between contract law and promissory
morality54 and others see no necessary connection.55 Thus, the debate
between moralists and amoralists about fiduciary law might be understood
as a species of a broader genus of discussions about whether legal concepts
with apparent referents in moral life have a specialized institutional
meaning.56
As such, the debate between moralists and amoralists implicates deeper
questions about legal theorizing. One barrier to resolving this debate about
fiduciary loyalty is that, in many respects, the moralist and amoralist
positions are so capacious that they can reach the same conclusions in most
cases. It is also difficult to provide an empirical resolution to the debate,
since moralists and amoralists might disagree about the relevant unit of
empirical assessment. To be sure, many courts analyzing fiduciary duties
employ moralist language. However, some courts reject it outright, and
others deploy moralized language differently across domains of fiduciary
law. It is possible that a thorough-going moralism applies in some pockets
of fiduciary law in some relational contexts but not trans-substantively.
Moreover, the moralized rhetoric of fiduciary law opinions strikes some
amoralists as mere rhetoric, and therefore, an unreliable predictor of what
courts and relevant legal actors will do in actual cases.57
LEGAL STUD. 697, 697 (2015) (“Legal enquiries . . . differ from philosophical ones in terms of the
character of factors [that] law is prepared to recognize as appropriate candidates for being a ‘cause’ of
the existence of a particular phenomenon. . . . [L]aw is not constrained by . . . metaphysical commitments
and so it seamlessly accommodates as ‘causes’ factors variously characterised as specific events, facts,
states of affairs, aspects of conduct events or things, absences, omissions, information, and
reasons . . . .”).
53. Compare John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 450–51
(2016) (positing that the legal definition of “cruel” punishment should be assessed entirely in terms of a
punishment’s effects, in contrast to ordinary notion according on which the punisher’s intention is also
relevant to assessing cruelty), with Meghan Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 124 (2010)
(positing that legal definition of “cruelty” overlaps with ordinary notion of term, according to which cruel
punishment is “exceptionally brutal” and involves “inflicting pain for a purpose other than punishment”).
54. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 708, 708 (2007); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 1 (1980).
55. See Michael Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2008) (“[T]he law
of contract is not concerned with promises as such and . . . contract and promise do not diverge in a way
that calls for justification.”).
56. See Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Term?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2015).
57. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 429.
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The empirical disagreements between moralists and amoralists in turn
implicate broader jurisprudential disagreements. Resolving the debate
between moralists and amoralists might be simple with a relatively welldeveloped theory about what law is and how past cases figure into the
existence of legal standards. Yet such theories of law are notoriously difficult
to formulate and defend.
The impasse between moralists and amoralists also turns on a variety of
contested substantive and normative issues. For example, moralists and
amoralists might disagree about the fundamental point of fiduciary
relationships. There is no uniformity on these issues, even among proponents
of amoralist views. Although nearly all who study fiduciary law worry about
predation and opportunism, these concerns do not resolve most core
differences between moralism and amoralism. Breaking the impasse about
the proper understanding of fiduciary loyalty would not only require
overcoming the empirical, jurisprudential, and substantive disagreements
between moralists and amoralists, but also transcending these same
disagreements among different versions of moralism and amoralism.
Our goal in what follows, then, is not to resolve the debate between
moralists and amoralists. Instead, in Part II, we expose a cognitive dimension
of fiduciary loyalty that we argue is part of positive fiduciary law. Therefore,
it can be appreciated from a variety of amoralist perspectives. And this
cognitive dimension can provide common ground from which moralist and
amoralist theories can debate substantive questions of fiduciary law, since
most moralists should also be able to see the roots of a cognitive dimension
of loyalty in ordinary morality.
II. COGNITIVISM ABOUT LOYALTY58
Our main goal in this Part is to demonstrate that there is a cognitive
dimension to fiduciary loyalty. A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty
posits that a fiduciary’s cognition bears on whether she satisfies her fiduciary
duties. By contrast, non-cognitivist accounts (for example, the existing
58. Our use of the term “cognitivism” differs from Gregory Alexander’s “cognitive theory of
fiduciary relationships.” Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 767 (2000). Alexander’s approach focuses on the likely cognitive biases of judges and
fact-finders interpreting fiduciary law. Our interest is with more fundamental questions about the nature
of fiduciary relationships and the cognitive requirements of fiduciary loyalty. Nor does our use of the
term implicate the metaethical position known as “cognitivism,” which holds that moral statements
express genuinely cognitive phenomena and are truth-apt. See ALEXANDER MILLER, CONTEMPORARY
METAETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2d ed., 2013). Apologies to Ben Zipursky, who advised us to jettison
“cognitivism” because of its connotation in metaethics. We almost certainly did not attribute the requisite
significance to his advice in our practical deliberations.
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versions of proscriptivism and contractarianism that we discussed in Part I)
interpret fiduciary loyalty entirely in terms of how a fiduciary behaves or,
perhaps, a combination of the fiduciary’s behavior and the results of its
action or inaction. Cognitivism is neither moralist nor amoralist per se.
Rather, it provides a way to traverse the impasse between these positions.
Our case for cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty is largely indirect. In
Section II.B, we identify several propositions that generalize across a wide
range of fiduciary law contexts. Each of these propositions is consistent with
a cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty. Further, cognitivism provides a
unified and powerful way to explain these propositions. If our reasoning is
sound, then our conclusions regarding fiduciary loyalty’s cognitive
dimension can be accepted by any moralist or amoralist who aims to describe
the law as it is. Section II.A briefly explores the cognitive dimension of
“ordinary” loyalty. Section II.B shows how a cognitivist account of loyalty
explains fiduciary law as well.
A. COGNITIVISM ABOUT “ORDINARY” LOYALTY
What is the nature of “ordinary” loyalty? What makes a person loyal?
What follows from identifying a person as loyal? Centuries of reflection on
these questions have not produced a consensus. Nearly every candidate for
the essential consideration constitutive of loyalty has been disputed.59
Moreover, the very moral significance of loyalty is also sharply contested
among philosophers.60
We cannot here resolve these longstanding philosophical debates.
However, some requirements relating to the cognitive dimension of loyalty
59. For example, some commentators argue that loyalty has an inextricably affective dimension:
if someone does not feel specific feelings on behalf of a person or cause, then she is not loyal to that
person or cause. See KELLER, supra note 6, at 21. Others deny that loyalty has such an affective
component, contending that someone can be loyal to a person or cause without feeling specific emotions
(or even being disposed to). See John Kleinig, Loyalty, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(rev. ed. 2017) (“[F]eelings of loyalty are probably not constitutive of loyalty, even if it is unusual to find
loyalty that is affectless.”).
60. On these accounts, someone’s loyalty to a person or cause might require her to act in ways that
are otherwise optional, or even permit her to act in ways that are otherwise forbidden. See, e.g., DAVID
OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 251 (2012) (“[T]he special value of friendship derives in
part from the bonds of loyalty that it entails. The involvement of obligation in friendship is part of what
makes friendship the great good that it is and the same is true of many other valuable relationships. Thus
our interest in friendship evinces a normative interest, an interest in obligation for its own sake.”). Other
accounts dispute the normative significance of loyalty either in part (for example, by denying that loyalty
can generate permissions) or in whole (for example, by denying that loyalty can generate reasons or
obligations). See, e.g., KELLER, supra note 6, at 144–45. A similar divide arises in debates over the
normative significance of patriotism: for example, whether loyalty provides a basis for political
obligation.
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appear to generalize across accounts of “ordinary” loyalty. In other words,
the conclusion that a person is loyal or acted loyally is, in part, based on an
assessment of her cognition. Satisfying the cognitive aspects of loyalty visà-vis the object of one’s loyalty is necessary, but not sufficient, to be loyal
to that object. Although this cognitive dimension might not appear explicitly
in accounts of loyalty that focus on affect, perceptual bias, habit, or
unthinking partiality, the best candidates for a theory of loyalty (rather than,
say, devotion or allegiance or fealty) have a cognitive dimension. In previous
work,61 we have identified three different cognitive aspects of loyalty:
deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness. Rather than reiterate our
arguments here, a trio of examples might better illustrate them.
Consider Shakespeare’s Iago, the quintessential literary example of
treachery. Iago is a longtime adviser to Othello. Jealous at Othello’s
promotion of Cassio,62 another soldier in the company, to the rank of
lieutenant, Iago plots to bring about Othello’s downfall. Iago fabricates
evidence and manipulates conditions in order to lead Othello to believe that
Cassio is having an affair with Desdemona, Othello’s wife. At the same time,
Iago purports to provide Othello and Cassio unvarnished advice about what
to do, some of which is even credible. As Iago puts it, he leads each man
down a “parallel course” that is “directly to his good.”63 Iago’s handiwork is
so skillful that Othello seems to convince himself of each step down the road
of murdering Desdemona.64
61. See Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J.
1820, 1828 (2016); Stephen R. Galoob & Ethan J. Leib, The Core of Fiduciary Political Theory, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 401, 407–12 (2018); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob,
Fiduciary Principles and Public Office, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 24, at
20–25.
62. And perhaps, enraged by the rumor that Othello had conducted an affair with Emilia, Iago’s
wife. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 1, sc. 3, 1. 380–83 (Burton Raffel ed., Yale Univ. Press
2005) (1622). (“[I]t is thought abroad that ‘twixt my sheets/He’s done my office. I know not if’t be
true/But I, for mere suspicion in that kind/Will do as if for surety.”). One disturbing interpretation of
Iago’s shifting rationalizations is that they reflect “motive-hunting,” an “attempt to bring intellectual
speculation to bear on a malignity that [Iago] does not really understand himself.” Laurence Lerner, The
Machiavel and the Moor, 9 ESSAYS IN CRIT. 339, 342–44 (1959).
63. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 62, act 2, sc. 3, 1. 325–26.
64. For example, Iago leads Othello to notice the most compelling evidence of Desdemona’s
(supposed) treachery in the following passage, during which he feigns to argue for her fidelity:
Iago: Her honour is an essence that’s not seen:
They have it very oft that have it not;
But for the handkerchiefs—
Othello: By heaven, I would most gladly have forgot it:
Thou said’st O, it comes o’er my memory,
As doth the raven o’er the infected house,
Boding to all he had my handkerchief.
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 62, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 19–22. The “he” in the last sentence refers to Cassio, who
has Desdemona’s handkerchief only because Iago had given it to him.
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One insight from Iago’s perfidy is that “ordinary” loyalty imposes
requirements on deliberation. If your deliberation regarding the object of
your loyalty does not satisfy these requirements, then you are not loyal. At
least two aspects of Iago’s disloyalty bear mentioning. First, although Iago’s
behavior toward Othello (lying, manipulating evidence) is objectionable in
its own right, Iago would not be so reviled if he had merely given bad advice
or misled his captain. There is something about the way that Iago uses
Desdemona, Cassio, and Othello that strikes many readers as particularly
objectionable. Second, Iago’s disloyalty is evident long before he gives his
fateful advice to Othello—indeed, long before Iago announces his
treacherous orientation in an opening soliloquy.
The cognitive dimension of loyalty explains both of these aspects of
Iago’s treachery. Independently of the quality of his advice to Othello, Iago’s
deliberation was defective because his plan to bring about Othello’s downfall
prioritized his own lust for revenge and disregarded the interests of Othello,
to whom he owed duties of loyalty. This conclusion implies that loyalty
imposes requirements on how someone deliberates. It also suggests that
these requirements can be violated regardless of how someone actually
behaves. Furthermore, Iago betrayed Othello by formulating his treacherous
plan. Counseling Desdemona’s murder and engineering Cassio’s
imprisonment were downstream effects of Iago’s prior betrayal.
A second insight is that “ordinary” loyalty requires conscientiousness—
that is, a certain type of connection between deliberation and action—
regarding the putative object of loyalty.65 You are not loyal to a person or
idea if you lack this conscientiousness toward them. Consider the saboteur,
another paradigmatic example of disloyalty. The saboteur feigns allegiance
to an ostensible object of loyalty while simultaneously working to undermine
it. A saboteur might have another object of loyalty (in which case she is a
double agent), or she might simply work to frustrate the success of the
ostensible object. The saboteur has an interest in behaving and deliberating
in ways that mimic loyalty, as did Iago. Doing so might help the saboteur or
the Machiavellian lieutenant evade detection and provide greater
opportunities for subversion. If the saboteur is disloyal even though she
65. See KELLER, supra note 6, at 2–3.
Just because someone deliberatively follows a principled pattern of behavior, or is committed—
perhaps fiercely—to a cause, does not mean that she is loyal. . . . [T]he facts about how a person
acts are not in themselves enough to tell us whether, or to what, she is loyal. If I reliably keep
my promises to you, then that might be because you are someone to whom I am loyal. Or, it
might be because I believe that people should always keep their promises, . . . or because I
promised your father that if I made you any promises I would keep them.
Id.
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behaves and deliberates exactly as a loyal person would, then loyalty must
implicate more than loyal behavior and deliberation. This additional element
is conscientiousness: given certain motivational profiles, someone can act
disloyally despite deliberating and behaving exactly as a loyal person would
have done.
Third, loyalty is a function of the robustness of one’s commitments to
the object of loyalty.66 If you are committed to a particular object, but your
commitment is too flimsy, then you are not loyal to that object. Consider
Petyr Baelish, nicknamed “Littlefinger,” from George R.R. Martin’s A Song
of Ice and Fire novels and the television show Game of Thrones. Littlefinger
is an ambitious nobleman from an insignificant family. In order to transcend
his station, he employs techniques such as ingratiating himself with members
of more powerful houses, catering to other nobles in a set of brothels that he
owns, and forming secret alliances with still other nobles. Many of these
efforts sow civic unrest and lead to the deaths of innocents (and, to be fair,
some not-so-innocents).67 However, as the character notes in an Iago-esque
soliloquy, all are in the service of acquiring power:
Chaos isn’t a pit. Chaos is a ladder. Many who try to climb it fail and never
get to try again. The fall breaks them. And some are given a chance to
climb, but they refuse. They cling to the realm, or the gods, or love—
illusions. Only the ladder is real. The climb is all there is. 68

As an example of his climb, Littlefinger facilitates an alliance between
the warring Tyrell and Lannister families that would be secured by
intermarriage between members of both families. Later, he plots with the
matriarch of the Tyrell family to arrange for the murder of Joffrey Lannister
before the consummation of his marriage to Margaery Tyrell, one of the very
marriages that Littlefinger brokered.
What makes Littlefinger such a powerful example of disloyalty?
Although like Iago he is fueled in part by jealousy, few, if any, of
Littlefinger’s plans involve the type of sustained fixation on and malice
66. See PHILIP PETTIT, THE ROBUST DEMANDS OF THE GOOD: ETHICS WITH ATTACHMENT,
VIRTUE, AND RESPECT 84–85 (2015); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, MORAL ENTANGLEMENTS: THE
ANCILLARY-CARE OBLIGATIONS OF MEDICAL RESEARCHERS 65, 85, 95–96 (2012) (arguing that moral
duties can morph and arise incidentally based on new information generated from types of interactions);
Nicholas Southwood, Democracy as a Modally Demanding Value, 49 NOÛS 504, 505 (2015).
67. William P. MacNeil, Machiavellian Fantasy and the Game of Laws, 57 CRITICAL Q. 34, 41
(2015) (For Littlefinger, “[s]urvival entails being ready, willing and able to advance one’s cause through
any and all means, including . . . taking the life of his not-so-fair lady wife, . . . all the while further
plotting to exterminate his pathetic little stepson, Lord Robert, the heir to the Eyrie and the guardianship
of the West.”).
68. Game of Thrones: The Climb (HBO television broadcast May 5, 2013).
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toward a specific other that characterize Shakespeare’s villain. Rather,
Littlefinger is distinguished by his contingency: regardless of how
committed he is to a person or cause now, he will abandon them without
compunction in order to pursue a future, aggrandizing option. A strategically
contingent commitment is not genuine loyalty. If the flimsiness of
Littlefinger’s commitment is evidence of disloyalty, then it follows that
robustness is a hallmark of “ordinary” loyalty. A loyal commitment must be
capable of withstanding at least some changes in circumstances.
B. COGNITIVISM IN FIDUCIARY LAW
Even if there is a cognitive dimension to ordinary loyalty, it does not
follow that this dimension also applies to fiduciary loyalty. Although a
number of fiduciary law concepts or doctrines (for example, “good faith,”
“fidelity,” the “duty to disclose,” and even certain ways of construing the
“duty of care”) seem to implicate cognitive considerations, these concepts
and doctrines are not explicitly a part of every jurisdiction’s fiduciary law.
Nor do they necessarily apply to every domain of fiduciary law within any
particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, an amoralist might well contend
(following Easterbrook and Fischel) that these doctrines are little more than
window dressing.
In the remainder of this Part, we provide an indirect argument for a
cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty. We first identify a series of
propositions that describe fiduciary loyalty in a variety of legal contexts. A
cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty provides a straightforward
explanation of each proposition and a unified explanation of all of the
propositions together. To be sure, some of these propositions might also be
explained by non-cognitivist accounts of fiduciary loyalty, especially if they
are revised to account for the propositions of fiduciary law that we identify
below. The explanation provided by non-cognitivist accounts is, by
comparison, less complete, less parsimonious, and less persuasive.
Our analysis here, if correct, does not definitively resolve the debate
between moralists and amoralists. However, it reduces the scope of
disagreement between these positions. Varieties of both amoralism and
moralism that aim to explain existing legal materials should accept that
fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension. So-called “pluralist” accounts
should also embrace cognitivism to the extent that fiduciary loyalty has a
cognitive dimension across jurisdictions and fiduciary contexts. Finally, our
case for the cognitivist dimension of fiduciary loyalty should allay many of
the most significant concerns of incompatibilists.
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In what follows, we show how the law routinely acknowledges the
relevance of cognitive dimensions to fiduciary obligation. Along the way,
we demonstrate the explanatory power of a cognitivist account by
contrasting it with two prominent versions of amoralism described in Part
I—proscriptivism and contractarianism—that cannot satisfactorily explain
all of the legal propositions we identify. These versions of amoralism are the
most popular among jurists and commentators, and proponents of these
views tend to formulate fiduciary loyalty exclusively in terms of behavior.
P1. Someone can breach her obligation of fiduciary loyalty even if the
results of her actions are consistent with those of a loyal course of
action and she behaves in exactly the way that a loyal fiduciary would
have behaved.
Whether a fiduciary has lived up to her duty of loyalty depends on more
than the results of her actions. A fiduciary’s actions can violate her fiduciary
duty of loyalty even though the beneficiary is not harmed by them—that is,
even when the beneficiary’s position is not made worse off by the fiduciary’s
action. Likewise, a fiduciary can violate her duty of loyalty even though she
behaves in exactly the way that a loyal fiduciary would have behaved.
Some might doubt that P1 actually describes U.S. law. For example, in
many U.S. jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the tort of
breach of fiduciary duty imposes a harm requirement: the fiduciary is only
liable to the beneficiary for “harm resulting from a breach of [fiduciary] duty
. . . .”69 However, it does not follow that loss causation is part of the fiduciary
duty itself, such that a fiduciary whose treachery is harmless has lived up to
the duty of loyalty. Rather, harm is best seen as an independent, redressrelated inquiry that arises in specific legal domains. In other words, the
question of harm might be relevant to whether the fiduciary is liable in tort
or for professional malpractice, but it is not integral to the notion of fiduciary
loyalty itself.70
A fiduciary’s harmless disloyalty violates her fiduciary duty. Put
differently, harmless disloyalty can have the same legal significance as
harmful disloyalty. This principle of fiduciary law applies at least within the
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also Longaker v. Evans,
32 S.W.3d 725, 733 (Tex. App. 2000).
70. For example, the “prejudice” requirements in “ineffective assistance of counsel” or collateral
relief contexts do not indicate that non-prejudicial betrayals are not themselves juridical or legal betrayals.
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law governing lawyers,71 agency law,72 and trust law.73 To illustrate,
consider an example from the law governing lawyers. Elliot Friedman was
an attorney acting for a group of plaintiffs in a tort suit that sought
compensation for victims of a sunken vessel near Kodiak Island, Alaska.74
Friedman put $81,000 of settlement money from one defendant into a trust
account for his plaintiff-client while awaiting a payment of $662,400 from
other defendants. Although Friedman had authority to put that first
contribution into his client’s trust account, the rest of the plaintiffs could not
agree how the remaining contributions should be distributed within the
plaintiff group. Indeed, it took approximately a year to come to terms about
the distribution of the settlement monies and to collect the whole sum. Four
days after the first contribution was made, and without permission from the
other plaintiffs or their attorneys, however, Friedman wrote himself a check
for $15,000 to cover some of his fees and outlaid costs. Subsequently, he
wrote a check for $10,000 to his client and paid himself another $3,000 in
fees out of the trust account.
In disciplining Friedman, the hearing committee “noted that Friedman
correctly believed [his client] would be entitled to substantially more than
the amount he had advanced to it and that [Friedman’s] total fees . . .
exceeded the fees he paid himself” out of the original $81,000 deposit.75 The
Alaska Supreme Court noted that “no client of Friedman’s suffered actual
injury [and] [t]he potential for financial injury . . . was minimal, because
Friedman had sufficient personal funds to cover any demand for money any
client or [plaintiff] might have made.”76 Yet even though the results for
Friedman’s clients were the same as if he had not misappropriated funds
from them, the Friedman court found that Friedman had breached his
fiduciary obligations to his clients.77 There is nothing remarkable about this
71. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999) (“It is the agent’s disloyalty, not
any resulting harm, that violates the fiduciary relationship . . . .”).
72. See, e.g., Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 160 S.W.2d 509, 514 (Tex. 1942);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 243 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959); see also In re
Bradish’s Estate, 8 Pa. D. 38, 42 (Orphans’ Ct. 1898) (“It is no answer to say, that after all there may be
no loss upon the judgments; this is little more than a plea, that a negligent trustee should be allowed a
further opportunity to take risks, because the inexcusable risks he has already taken have not yet fallen
out against him.”).
74. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 622–23 (Alaska 2001).
75. Id. at 624.
76. Id. at 631.
77. It does not follow that issues of harm are irrelevant to the assessment of Friedman’s
misconduct. Then-applicable disciplinary rules (which tracked the American Bar Association’s Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions) directed the court to assess any injury caused by Friedman’s misconduct,
and the Friedman Court found that Friedman’s actions inflicted “actual injury to the public, because ‘the
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conclusion. Friedman took money from a trust account too soon, and this
action was no less a breach of trust because it (fortuitously) did not harm his
clients.
The fiduciary’s course of action can also violate fiduciary loyalty even
when it is identical to the behavior that a loyal fiduciary would have
undertaken. Consider the case of In re Nine Systems Corp. Shareholders
Litigation, in which the Delaware Chancery Court was asked to evaluate a
board’s discharge of its fiduciary duties in connection with the
recapitalization of a media start-up company.78 The 2002 recapitalization—
which valued the company at $4 million—enabled controlling shareholders
to increase their equity in the company, diluting the plaintiffs’ ownership
interest from 26% of the company to 2% of it. When the company was sold
in 2006 for $175 million, plaintiffs sought $130 million in damages on the
grounds that, because the 2002 recapitalization was unfair, the board’s
approval of this transaction constituted a breach of fiduciary duties.
The Nine Systems court held that, although the price paid during the
2002 recapitalization was fair, the directors still breached their fiduciary
duties because they did not follow a fair process. According to the court, the
board and independent sources were insufficiently involved in the valuation,
which was done as a “back of the envelope” calculation with “handwritten
scribbles.”79 The plaintiffs were not fully aware of the recapitalization until
after it was implemented. As such, they were unable to participate in the
valuation process. The only director who sought to dissent from the
recapitalization (who was also the sole independent director) was
deliberately excluded from deliberations: the controlling group chose to hold
meetings on the Sabbath or other Jewish holidays when they knew he could
not attend because of his religious commitments.80
The court found that the value of the company in 2002 was actually
close to $0.81 Thus, the 2006 transaction was even more generous to plaintiffs
than a loyal fiduciary would have provided to them. However, the directors
were still found to have breached their fiduciary duties by engaging in an
public suffers injury whenever a lawyer fails to maintain personal integrity by improperly handling funds
held in trust.’” Id. However, the issue of harm was relevant to the secondary question of the kind discipline
(suspension or disbarment) that Friedman should have been subjected to for having violated his fiduciary
duties to clients. It was not relevant to the primary question of whether Friedman violated his fiduciary
duties in the first place.
78. In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS
171 (Sept. 4, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Fuchs v. Wren Holdings, LLC, 129 A.3d 882 (Del. 2015).
79. Id. at *5, *25.
80. Id. at *13, *21, *42.
81. Id. at *140.
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inadequate procedure.82 An animating idea in Vice Chancellor Noble’s
opinion in Nine Systems is that behavior otherwise identical to that of a
careful and loyal fiduciary can be deficient due to defects in “process.”83
A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty can explain why both aspects
of P1 make sense. Harmless treachery violates fiduciary loyalty, not merely
because the beneficiary is made worse off by it (as in Friedman) or because
a loyal fiduciary would have behaved differently (as in Nine Systems).
Rather, some aspects of fiduciary loyalty cannot be reduced to results or
behavior. Cognitivism posits an irreducibly cognitive aspect of fiduciary
loyalty: fiduciary loyalty, like ordinary loyalty, imposes standards on how
the fiduciary should deliberate about what to do. These deliberative
requirements are freestanding. Failure to satisfy them is sufficient to
constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty. The cognitivist can thus provide a
unified explanation why Friedman violated his fiduciary duty to his clients
and why the Nine Systems board violated its fiduciary duties. Both
Friedman’s behavior and deliberation were defective, even though the results
of his behavior did not harm his clients. The Nine Systems board’s
deliberation was defective, even though the results of their actions did not
harm the corporation and a loyal board might have reached exactly the same
decision.
Proscriptivism cannot explain both aspects of P1. To be sure, a
proscriptivist can straightforwardly account for the possibility of a harmless
breach of fiduciary duties by invoking the prophylactic nature of fiduciary
duties.84 On proscriptivism, Friedman’s performance was deficient (even if
his clients were not harmed) because he violated the no-conflict and no-profit
rules. However, the proscriptivist cannot easily explain how fiduciary loyalty
could be violated when a fiduciary behaves in exactly the way that a loyal
fiduciary would. The Nine Systems board had no conflict of interest and did
not extract any direct profit from the 2002 recapitalization. Nevertheless, it
violated its duty of loyalty because its deliberative process was defective.
82. Although the Nine Systems court did not award disgorgement or rescission on account of the
finding of a fair price, it granted attorney’s fees to plaintiffs for successfully establishing that defendants
had breached their fiduciary duties. See id. at *160. For another case—this time a trust law example—in
which a court found a breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of damage to the plaintiff and then
remediated through awarding of attorney’s fees, see In re Wilson, 930 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010).
83. See In re Nine Sys., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171, at *145–46. A companion opinion in Ross
Holding & Management Co. v. Advance Realty Group, C.A. No. 4113-VCN, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 173,
at *60 (Sept. 4, 2014) similarly reinforces that fair dealing and fair process is a part of fiduciary obligation,
even when the relevant transaction produces a price that loyal fiduciaries would have reached.
84. See CONAGLEN, supra note 33, at 70–71, 74.
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The proscriptivist cannot explain a violation that does not involve a
transgression of either the no-profit or no-conflict rules. Even if a fiduciary’s
decisional process could be reframed as a kind of conduct, proscriptivism
could not capture the significance of a deliberative command as cognitivist
accounts can.
The contractarian position also has difficulty explaining both aspects of
P1. For the contractarian, gaps in the fiduciary relationship should be filled
ex post by inquiring what the parties would have bargained for ex ante. This
hypothetical bargaining methodology might explain why a fiduciary might
violate the duty of loyalty even when she behaves in the way that a loyal
fiduciary would. In Nine Systems, for example, the board’s decision
procedure regarding the 2002 recapitalization might have been judged
unnecessarily risky, since it imperiled the interests of minority shareholders
in a way that increased the possibility that the value of their shares would be
diminished in some future transaction. This exposure to risk could be
appreciated from the contractarian’s ex ante perspective.85 However, the
contractarian cannot easily explain the possibility of a harmless violation of
fiduciary loyalty in general, or the Friedman case in particular. Friedman’s
clients were not harmed by his temporary misappropriation; moreover,
because Friedman’s personal wealth exceeded the amount of the settlement
funds, they could not have been harmed by his pre-payment (so long as
Friedman would have been liable to cover any losses from his personal
account). Under the contractarian picture of hypothetical bargaining, if there
is no prospect of harm from an action, then that action cannot be part of the
content of fiduciary duties. Cognitivist accounts, then, can more
straightforwardly explain both aspects of P1 than either proscriptivism or
contractarianism.
P2. Ceteris paribus, a fiduciary whose deliberation and behavior are both
deficient more seriously violates fiduciary loyalty than one whose
behavior or deliberation alone is deficient.
At first, the cognitivist position appears difficult to reconcile with the
seemingly “strict” nature of fiduciary liability. In criminal law, violations
usually require both a prohibited course of action and a specified mental
state. By contrast, breach of fiduciary duty is sometimes said to be a matter
of “per se” or strict liability: the fiduciary’s behavior is sufficient to support
85. This approach would require the contractarian to abandon the methodological commitment to
behaviorism, which (as noted above) many legal economists posit as a core tenet of the contractarian
position. Or it would require thinking about process as just another kind of behavior.
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the conclusion that she has breached her duty.86 Given the prophylactic
nature of fiduciary rules, establishing a fiduciary’s culpable mental state is
generally not required to show that she is subject to liability. Likewise, a
fiduciary who behaves in a prohibited way cannot generally evade liability
on the grounds that the fiduciary’s mental state was innocent or that the
fiduciary made an honest mistake.
Despite this apparent tension, however, the strict nature of fiduciary
liability is consistent with the cognitivist picture of fiduciary loyalty. That
deviant behavior is sufficient for fiduciary liability does not imply that it is
also necessary. Even if good intentions don’t exculpate otherwise deviant
behavior, bad intentions (of a certain type, at least) might inculpate otherwise
innocuous behavior.87 To draw a parallel with criminal law, the existence of
some strict liability crimes does not rule out the possibility that other, more
serious crimes might have a mental state component.
Across a range of legal contexts, courts differentiate breaches of
fiduciary liability in which the fiduciary lacks a culpable mental state from
those in which the fiduciary has a mens rea. Both types of case involve a
breach of fiduciary duty. However, courts deem the latter type of breach to
be more serious and assign more substantial collateral consequences to it
than the former. This logic is captured in P2.
As a first example, take the Friedman case considered above. Although
the Friedman court noted that “fiduciary violations do not require subjective
awareness of wrongdoing,”88 Friedman’s “mental state,”89 his “conscious
intention,”90 his “state of mind,”91 and his “dishonest” and “selfish motive”92
were relevant to determining how serious his breach of fiduciary duty was.
This framework is consistent with both ABA standards and the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. Indeed, some analysts conclude that
86. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Strict Character of Fiduciary Liability, 2006 N.Z. L. REV. 209
passim (2006); Penner, supra note 29, at 175; Smith, supra note 29 passim. In some jurisdictions, the
character of fiduciary liability is less-than-strict, in that it is subject to exceptions (for example, “entire
fairness” review under Delaware corporate law). Yet even these types of exceptions are consistent with
the “strict” character of fiduciary liability in that questions of neither liability nor exception turn on
aspects of the fiduciary’s cognition.
87. An example of this dynamic in the private law might be found in Hollywood Silver Fox Farm,
Ltd. v. Emmett [1936] 2 KB 468 (Eng.), in which the court found that although a neighbor had a right to
shoot a gun off on his own property, it would be actionable if the neighbor intended this shooting to
disturb the breeding activities of the fox farm next door.
88. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 630 n.37 (Alaska 2001).
89. Id. at 625–26, 630, 632.
90. Id. at 632.
91. Id. at 630, 633.
92. Id. at 632–33.
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considerations of fault generally explain how courts and other bodies enforce
the rules of professional responsibility that govern lawyers, even if many
rules of professional conduct can be violated without regard to a lawyer’s
culpability.93 Thus, although “fault” is not required to find a breach of
fiduciary obligation as a matter of fiduciary law, it is relevant to
considerations about how to classify specific violations of fiduciary duty.
Courts provide a similar (and indirect) kind of scrutiny to the intentional
stance of fiduciaries in U.S. bankruptcy law. The U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted § 523(a)(4) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code94—which lists
“defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity” as a non-dischargeable
debt—to include a “culpable state of mind requirement.”95 Notwithstanding
that the underlying debt may have been imposed with indifference to the state
of mind of the fiduciary, the dischargeability of that debt in bankruptcy turns
on whether the fiduciary’s actions “involve[d] knowledge of, or gross
recklessness in respect to, the improper nature of the relevant fiduciary
behavior.”96 As far as the Court is concerned, “conscious[] disregard[]” of a
risk of violating a fiduciary duty is enough to trigger non-dischargeability.97
This conclusion supports P2, in that a breach of fiduciary obligation with
mens rea is more serious and has a different legal status than a negligent or
unwitting breach.
In both the United States98 and other jurisdictions,99 an assessment of
93. See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 20 (2010). Although Moore’s conclusions about the presumption against strict liability in these
contexts seem motivated by policy considerations pertaining to the consequences of lawyer discipline on
the lawyer, one might see these cognitive requirements as themselves flowing from fiduciary obligation,
thus requiring no explicit codification. See Charles Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as
Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689 (2006). But see STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS, 186–87 (7th ed. 2005) (finding many fiduciary obligations to
trigger “absolute liability” with no mens rea requirement).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2012).
95. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., 569 U.S. 267, 269 (2013).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 273–74.
98. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 243, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (compensation
ordinarily denied to trustee who misappropriates trust property or “intentionally or negligently
mismanages the whole trust”); DeMott, supra note 30, at 929 (“[A] fiduciary may forfeit commissions or
other compensation paid or otherwise due during a period of disloyal service, although, at least in the
agency context, courts qualify the availability of forfeiture by requiring that the breach have had a
deliberate character, often that it have been ‘wilful’ or ‘egregious.’”).
99. For example, the UK’s law controlling trustees, Trustee Act 2000 § 31(1) (UK), protects
trustees, indemnifying them for expenses—even if those expenses are unauthorized—when the trustee
acts in “good faith.” Evidence regarding the fiduciary’s deliberation therefore even provides immunity
against liability in certain circumstances. See also Trustee Act 1925 § 15 (Gr. Brit.); In re Smith’s Estate
[1937] Ch. 636 (Eng.); Vyse v. Foster (1872) LR 8 Ch. App. 309, 336–67 (Eng.). This feature of UK
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the fiduciary’s state of mind bears on important questions, such as the
availability of defenses and the seriousness of collateral consequences of the
fiduciary’s breach, even if a fiduciary can violate the duty of loyalty without
a culpable mental state. As the attorney discipline and fiduciary defalcation
standards illustrate, the more culpable the fiduciary’s mental state, the more
serious the breach of her fiduciary duty will be.
P2 is clearly consistent with cognitivism. The cognitivist can contend
that behavior and cognition are both aspects of fiduciary duty. Deficient
behavior is sufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty, regardless of
whether it is the product of deficient cognition. Thus, the cognitivist can
explain the “strict” character of fiduciary liability in terms of institutional
considerations—for example, that the discretion fiduciaries have in
paradigmatic fiduciary relationships complicates any effort to distinguish
malicious actions from benign ones. Fiduciary rules primarily implicate
assessments of a fiduciary’s behavior because legal institutions are illequipped to conduct routine retrospective assessments of the complex
judgments and mental states that constitute fiduciary loyalty. Yet despite the
ostensibly behaviorist orientation of many fiduciary rules, actions involving
both prohibited behavior and a discernable mens rea are treated as more
serious than actions involving only prohibited behavior.
Non-cognitivist accounts of fiduciary loyalty have greater difficulty
explaining P2. Existing versions of proscriptivism not only define fiduciary
liability entirely in terms of the no-profit and no-conflict rules, but also
define both of these prohibitions largely in terms of behavior. As we
explained in Part I, construing fiduciary loyalty in terms of behavior is part
of what makes proscriptivism akin to fiduciary law for the Holmesian bad
man. In light of its implicit behaviorism, proscriptivism cannot attribute any
significance to mental states in answering questions related to fiduciary law.
Therefore, proscriptivism rules out in advance the possibility of the mens
rea-based standards described by P2.100 P2 also seems inconsistent with
trustee law is discussed in Ho, supra note 12, at 17–18.
100. The proscriptivist might respond by defining the dynamics identified in P2 as deviant or,
alternatively, by contending that these are “nominate,” rather than distinctively “fiduciary,” aspects of
fiduciary duties. This strategy is not a promising way to identify what is distinctive about fiduciary duties,
since it pre-commits to defining the distinctiveness of fiduciary responsibilities in terms of their unique
aspects. By conflating distinctiveness and uniqueness, this strategy rules out in advance the possibility
that what is distinctive about fiduciary responsibilities is a unique combination of “nominate” duties, none
of which are themselves unique to fiduciary relationships. To analogize, other hockey players might be
able to pass, shoot, skate, evade checks, score goals, and set up assists as well as Wayne Gretzky could.
Gretzky, however, was a unique hockey player because of his combination of these (non-unique) talents.
Yet if distinctiveness were defined entirely in terms of the uniqueness of specific components, as many
proscriptivists suggest we should do to establish the fiduciarity of a duty, then one could reach the risible
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existing versions of contractarianism. Contractarians usually see issues of
fault and mens rea as irrelevant to questions regarding breach of contract.101
To the extent that P2 identifies ways that mental states matter to specific
questions of fiduciary law, it is inconsistent with existing versions of
proscriptivism and contractarianism.102 Any path to explaining P2 would
seem to invoke cognitivism then.
P3. Efforts toward betrayal can violate fiduciary loyalty, regardless of
whether these efforts are completed or successful.
In western criminal law, an “inchoate” or incomplete crime is one for
which a person can be liable, despite not engaging in prohibited behavior or
bringing about a prohibited result. Inchoate crimes include attempt,
solicitation, and conspiracy. The most powerful justifications for inchoate
crimes presuppose that the criminal law is concerned with a person’s
cognition: attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to engage in prohibited
behavior or bring about a prohibited result indicates a defendant’s culpably
defective deliberation.103
As in criminal law, fiduciary law prohibits inchoate efforts to betray a
principal. A fiduciary’s attempt to betray a principal—for example, where
the fiduciary, with the goal of betraying the principal, takes some significant
action towards realizing that goal—constitutes a violation of her fiduciary
duty. Solicitations of betrayal—for example, where the fiduciary has the goal
of betraying the principal and seeks the help of another in order to realize
that goal—also violate the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty. The same conclusion
also applies to conspiracies to betray, in which the fiduciary and another
agree on a course of action to betray the principal. P3 captures each of these
inchoate ways of violating fiduciary loyalty.
Existing fiduciary law supports the idea that attempts, solicitations, or
conspiracies to betray the principal can constitute a violation of fiduciary
conclusion that Wayne Gretzky was not a distinctive hockey player.
101. On the role of fault in contract law, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Foreword: Fault in
American Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1346–47 (2009).
102. Neither of these incompatibilities is based on a conceptual commitment. One possible version
of proscriptivism might see a fiduciary’s mental state as relevant to the formulation of how to provide
relief for violations of the no-profit and no-conflict rules, either of which could turn on cognitive
considerations. Likewise, one could imagine a version of contractarianism on which mental states
mattered to performance—that is, in which both the behavior and cognition of a counterparty were
modeled as relevant to a hypothetical bargainer. However, most theorists who embrace proscriptivism
and contractarianism would likely reject these modifications, since advocates of these views see their
implicit behaviorism as a strength, rather than as a weakness.
103. See R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 133–34 (1997); GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 21–25
(2010).
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duty. For example, the Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers
announces that “a lawyer is . . . subject to professional discipline . . . for
attempting to commit a violation” of the lawyer’s obligations to her client104
and the American Bar Association’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct
8.4(a) deems it professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or attempt
to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.”105 Likewise, inchoate efforts
at betrayal (including solicitations and conspiracies) have been found to
violate the duty of loyalty in a variety of other domains of U.S. fiduciary law,
for example in agency law,106 corporate law,107 and elsewhere.108 The same
conclusions also apply to the law governing fiduciaries in other
jurisdictions.109
The criminal law of many jurisdictions distinguishes between attempts
to commit a crime and “mere preparation” towards committing a crime. The
former are criminally prohibited, while the latter are not. In both, a defendant
has a plan or conscious objective to act in a prohibited way or bring about a
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(emphasis added). The comments explain that the same standards for assessing the charge of attempt in
criminal law also apply in the lawyer disciplinary context—namely, whether the lawyer had the requisite
intent to violate the provision and took a substantial step in the course of conduct that was planned to
culminate in the commission of the offense (and that, on the whole, strongly corroborates this purpose).
Id. § 5(2) cmt. e.
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); see also Financial Gen.
Bankshares v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 746, 772 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating attorney’s unsuccessful
attempts to take over company constituted violations of fiduciary duty); Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 212–13 (Ct. App. 1997) (stating attorney’s attempted and
unsuccessful betrayal of client interests by selling out client for a personal payment was a breach of
fiduciary duty).
106. Union Miniere, S.A. v. Parday Corp., 521 N.E.2d 700, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (stating an
agent’s unsuccessful attempt to harm the principal was a breach of fiduciary duty); Town & Country
House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 189 A.2d 390, 392–94 (Conn. 1963) (stating an agent’s solicitation
of principal’s clients is a breach of fiduciary obligation); Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v.
Newbery, 147 N.E.2d 724, 726 (N.Y. 1958) (same). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04
(AM. LAW INST. 2006) (disallowing solicitation of clients but providing narrow window for “preparation”
to compete with the principal).
107. E.g., Dower v. Mosser Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 188–89 (3rd Cir. 1981) (“A merger intended
solely to ‘freeze out’ or ‘cash out’ minority equity holders from their positions may be enjoined as an
attempted breach of that fiduciary duty”); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(“[A]ny attempt to ‘squeeze out’ a minority shareholder must be viewed as a breach of . . . fiduciary
duty.”).
108. Navigant Consulting, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 508 F.3d 277, 284–85 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding
employees who attempted to sell their employers business can be found to have violated “the most basic
norms”).
109. E.g., Item Software (UK) Ltd. v. Fassihi [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244, para 41 (Eng.) (holding
that unsuccessful attempt to usurp a business opportunity violated director’s duty to confess, which was
entailed by the “fundamental” fiduciary duty to “act in what he in good faith considers to be the best
interests of his company”); Shepherds Invs. Ltd. v. Walters [2006] EWHC 836 (Ch).
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prohibited result. However, “merely preparatory” plans are remote and
therefore not appropriately criminalized.110 Here, fiduciary law diverges
from criminal law: some “merely preparatory” efforts of a fiduciary to betray
her principal can still constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty.111
To summarize, P3 indicates that a broader variety of activity that does
not involve prohibited behavior can nevertheless violate fiduciary loyalty.
As in criminal law, fiduciary loyalty can be violated by inchoate attempts,
solicitations, or conspiracies. However, unlike criminal law, fiduciary
loyalty can be violated by a fiduciary’s “merely preparatory” actions toward
betraying the principal.
A cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty can straightforwardly explain
P3. If fiduciary norms concern the fiduciary’s cognition (in particular, her
deliberation and conscientiousness), then certain patterns of deficient or
deviant cognition can constitute violations of fiduciary norms.112
Cognitivism can explain why a fiduciary’s deviant behavior is unnecessary
to violate fiduciary norms, even if it is sufficient to do so. Trying to betray
someone is a way of betraying them, even if the treachery does not succeed
and, indeed, even if it does not proceed very far down the path toward
success.
Proscriptivism, by contrast, cannot easily explain P3. Proscriptivism
interprets the no-conflict and no-profit rules in terms of results.
Proscriptivism thus reduces the requirements of fiduciary loyalty to two
110. The different standards for determining remoteness are reflected in different ways of specifying
the actus reus required for attempt liability. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 103, at 33–75; YAFFE, supra note
103, at 255–83.
111. E.g., Mattern & Assocs., L.L.C. v. Seidel, 678 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 n.10 (D. Del. 2010)
(recognizing an action for attempted breach of fiduciary duty in a “preparations to compete” case);
Shepherds Invs. Ltd. v. Walters [2006] EWHC 836 (Ch) (suggesting that preparatory steps to breach
fiduciary obligation is itself a betrayal). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (AM. LAW
INST. 2006) (suggesting that some room for permissible preparation is part of the law of agency).
112. To be sure, cognitivists might be concerned with imposing too onerous standards on
fiduciaries. The concern might arise out of fairness (the notion that controlling one’s own motivations
and deliberation, if not impossible, is far more difficult than controlling one’s behavior) or as a potential
defeater to the ostensible benefits of discretion. To allay this concern, the cognitivist might draw a further
parallel to the criminal law distinction between liability for completed and attempted crimes. For result
or status crimes, liability can be grounded on satisfying the behavioral and/or result elements (for
example, by bringing about a prohibited result or behaving in a prohibited way), even though the
defendant does not have a highly culpable mental state. Yet a highly culpable mental state is required in
order to establish liability for an attempt of the same crime. For example, someone who has a mental state
of negligence or recklessness can be liable for battery, but liability for attempted battery requires a
purposive mental state. On this logic, the cognitivist might concede that liability for a successful breach
of fiduciary duty can be based on low-grade mental states like negligence or even without a mens rea,
while still maintaining that a higher-order mental state is required to ground liability for inchoate
violations of fiduciary duty.
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rules: the fiduciary cannot “act[] with a conflict between duty and interest”
and she cannot “mak[e] a profit off of the fiduciary position.”113 If the
fiduciary does not have a conflict of interest, then she does not violate the
no-conflict rule. Likewise, if the fiduciary does not make an inappropriate
profit from a relationship, then she does not violate the no-profit rule. The
clarity of these standards is another basis for our assertion that proscriptivism
is fiduciary law for the Holmesian bad man: the fiduciary and others can
easily determine whether there has been a violation of fiduciary duty at any
time. Yet requiring prohibited results in order to find a violation of fiduciary
loyalty is inconsistent with P3, since this requirement rules out the possibility
that fiduciary loyalty can be violated by attempted, solicited, conspired, or
prepared treachery.
To be sure, proscriptivism might be revised to capture P3. In particular,
a proscriptivist might expand the understanding of the no-profit and noconflict rules to prohibit both successful and inchoate violations. Such a
cognitivist revision to proscriptivism seems more defensible than existing
versions. After all, whatever makes it wrong for a fiduciary to take profits
from a beneficiary would also make it wrong to try or conspire to take these
profits. Indeed, we conjecture that courts in jurisdictions that explicitly
endorse proscriptivism (“even in Australia,” to paraphrase a popular
children’s book from our youth)114 would adopt something like this
cognitivist formulation if confronted with cases of inchoate treachery. But
these revisions would reduce the clarity that makes proscriptivism so
appealing as fiduciary law for the bad man.
Contractarianism also has difficulty explaining P3. There is no cause of
action for an attempted breach of contract; an unsuccessful effort to breach
a contract is not a breach.115 If fiduciary loyalty were merely a species of
contract law, then we would expect that fiduciary loyalty could not be
breached through attempts. Yet P3 denies exactly this implication. A
contractarian might respond to this criticism by construing a prohibition on
attempted betrayals as an implicit term that would be agreed upon as part of
a hypothetical bargaining process. But this move would concede that
fiduciary norms are not fully explicable in terms of contractual norms, that a
113. CONAGLEN, supra note 33, at 459–60.
114. JUDITH VIORST, ALEXANDER AND THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD DAY
(1972).
115. To be sure, an attempted breach of contract might give a promisee a justification for demanding
an assurance from her promisor—but it would not be itself treated as a breach of the underlying
contractual commitment. That said, some courts might see an announced intent to breach or anticipatory
breach as a kind of “attempted breach of contract.” See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Louisville v. Cont’l Ill.
Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 933 F.2d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 1991).
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fiduciary’s deliberation and cognition matter more than a typical contractual
counterparty’s do. Moreover, recognizing a cognitive dimension of fiduciary
duties would violate one of the basic tenets of the law-and-economics
tradition out of which contractarianism arises—namely, that behavior is the
fundamental unit of analysis. In sum, both proscriptivism and
contractarianism have difficulty explaining P3 because they are not
formulated in cognitivist terms.
P4. At least some connections between a fiduciary’s deliberation and
action can constitute violations of fiduciary loyalty.
P1, P2, and P3 address some of the deliberative demands the law
imposes on fiduciaries. Aside from these deliberative demands, fiduciary
loyalty can also implicate the fiduciary’s motivations.116 In other words, it is
possible for a fiduciary to behave and deliberate in appropriate ways, yet to
violate her fiduciary duty of loyalty because of inappropriate motivations.
Which motivations can violate the duty of loyalty? It is difficult to answer
this question in the abstract. However, the point can be illustrated by
focusing on some paradigmatic examples.
One type of inappropriate motivation is that of the double agent. A
double agent pledges her allegiance to a principal, while simultaneously
operating on behalf of another (adverse) principal.117 Because of the
prophylactic nature of the conflicts of interest rules applicable to fiduciaries,
the double agent obviously violates fiduciary loyalty regardless of how she
deliberates and behaves. That said, perhaps the best explanation for the
prophylactic nature of the conflict of interest rule rests on the subtle influence
of motivation. The fiduciary’s conflicted interest raises the possibility of
changes in her actions, changes so subtle that others (and even the fiduciary
herself) might not appreciate them.
Like the double agent, the classic self-dealer clearly violates the
fiduciary duty of loyalty. Given the prophylactic character of the no-profit
rule, no further assessment of the fiduciary’s motivations or behavior is
needed to reach this conclusion. Here too, the prophylactic character of the
116. Lionel Smith concludes that fiduciary duties require the fiduciary to act with an appropriate
motivation, even though (he argues) this requirement is not and should not be legally enforceable. See
Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY, AND TRUSTS: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53 passim (J. Getzler ed., 2003). But see Smith, supra note 4, at 152;
Strine et al., supra note 5, at 633 (“[Under Delaware law] good faith has long been used as the key element
in defining the state of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary.”).
117. See, for example, Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz,
31 F. Supp. 3d 237, 259–60 (D.D.C. 2014) and the discussion of this case in Deborah A. DeMott, The
Poseur as Agent, in AGENCY LAW IN COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 35, 44–45 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2016).
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rules might be justified by a worry about the difficulty of discerning what,
exactly, motivates any particular course of action by a fiduciary.
Yet the double agent and the self-dealer do not exhaust the parameters
of disloyalty. Consider the saboteur, who acts in order to undermine the
projects of her principal rather than to promote her own interests or those of
a third party. The saboteur seems at least as treacherous as the double agent.
As the U.S. Supreme Court once recognized, “[h]e who is loyal is by
definition not a spy or a saboteur.”118 The main difference between the cases
concerns the structure of the treacherous motivation: the double agent
subverts in order to advance the interests of a third party, while the saboteur
might lack such an ulterior inspiration. There is no good reason, however,
for fiduciary law to treat the saboteur differently from the double agent. To
be sure, the prophylactic nature of conflict of interest rules makes proving
someone to be a double agent easier than proving her to be a saboteur. Yet
across a range of fiduciary law domains119 and jurisdictions,120 sabotage
constitutes a violation of fiduciary duty.
Consider Commonwealth v. Washington,121 a case concerning effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Vinson Washington was convicted of robbery and first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. On appeal, Washington argued that his counsel at trial
was constitutionally ineffective, a claim that requires showing that counsel’s
performance was deficient and also that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant—in particular, that there was a “reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different” if the
defendant had “been represented by adequate counsel.”122 Washington
alleged that his trial counsel hated him.123 This antipathy, Washington
contended, prompted the trial counsel to sabotage Washington’s defense,
which (according to Washington) violated counsel’s duty of loyalty toward
Washington.124 Washington argued first that “prejudice” should be
118. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
119. See MiMedx Grp., Inc. v. Fox, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121801, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2017)
(“A corporate officer who sabotages the company may do so for no personal gain, but nevertheless breach
a fiduciary duty owed to firm.”); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 (Del. 2008) (holding that
allegations of sabotage is a violation of fiduciary duty).
120. See Ho, supra note 12, at 50; Lusina Ho & Pey Woan Lee, A Director’s Duty to Confess: A
Matter of Good Faith?, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 347, 360–61 (2007).
121. Commonwealth v. Washington, 880 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2005).
122. Id. at 544.
123. In support of this conclusion, Washington noted a letter to a potential defense psychiatric
expert in which trial counsel stated that Washington “may epitomize the banality of evil.” Id. at 541.
124. Id. at 541–42.
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presumed “upon proof of animosity between an attorney and client”125 and
(alternatively) that Washington actually suffered prejudice because trial
counsel’s animosity led him to perform deficiently on Washington’s
behalf.126 The state countered that Washington’s trial counsel vigorously
represented his interests at trial, for example, by extensively cross-examining
key witnesses and arguing that Washington’s confession was invalid.127
The Washington Court accepted Washington’s argument in part. The
animosity of Washington’s trial counsel was not directly relevant to his
ineffective assistance claim, as “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not govern the
feelings that flow between an attorney and his client.”128 However, proof of
such animosity was relevant to the extent that it indicated trial counsel’s
sabotage: “[i]f counsel abrogates his obligation to his client because of
personal animosity that the accused will be deprived of his right to a fair trial,
such action will support a claim for a violation of the Sixth Amendment,” so
long as a client can establish both a direct connection between “the animosity
expressed by counsel and the actions of counsel taken on behalf of [the
client]” and that “but for the actions of counsel, the outcome of the matter
would have been different.”129 The Washington Court rejected the state’s
argument that an entirely objective standard should determine whether the
attorney has met his duty of loyalty to the client. Rather, the sabotage alleged
in this case (if true) would indicate “a total disintegration of the function of
trial counsel, implying a violation of the ethical standards of the profession,
a dereliction of counsel’s duty to the court, and a profound failure to the
client.”130 The lesson of Washington is that sabotage violates fiduciary
loyalty, while hatred alone is not necessarily inconsistent with fiduciary
loyalty. Washington, then, not only illustrates the (legitimate) relevance of
cognition to fiduciary obligation, but also shows how cognitive inquiries
might devolve into the (illegitimate) policing of the fiduciary’s affect and
125. Id. at 544.
126. Id. at 541.
127. Id. at 542.
128. Id. at 543. In support of this point, the Washington Court cited Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d
1283, 1294–98, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002) (finding a cognizable, but not dispositive, Sixth Amendment claim
where attorney failed to investigate potential alibis or relevant information, did nearly no preparation for
case, and admitted afterward in affidavit that he abhorred homosexuals—like his client—and believed
that these feelings affected his representation) and Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir.
1994) (cognizable, but not dispositive, ineffective assistance claim where attorney called client “a stupid
. . . son of a bitch” and opined that client should be imprisoned for life).
129. Washington, 880 A.2d at 545; see also Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1997)
(lawyer violated the duty of loyalty through “a total failure to actively advocate his client’s cause” and
“repeated expressions of contempt for his client for his alleged actions”).
130. Washington, 880 A.2d at 545.
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emotions.
If the saboteur violates a fiduciary duty, then fiduciary law imposes
standards regarding the fiduciary’s conscientiousness. However, courts
could disagree in how to classify the problem that such a lack of
conscientiousness presents. On a more direct analytic route, sabotage might
be seen as a violation of fiduciary loyalty itself. This is consistent with the
famous Delaware case of Stone v. Ritter, in which the court found the duty
of good faith applicable to fiduciaries to be part of the classic fiduciary duty
of loyalty.131
There are, however, more circuitous routes to ground the legal liability
of the saboteur. One such indirect route evaluates the saboteur in light of the
rules that implement fiduciary loyalty by “elaborat[ing] the application of
loyalty . . . to recurring circumstances.”132 The saboteur’s lack of
conscientiousness could be considered to violate one or more of these
implementing rules. Recall Item Software (UK) Ltd. v. Fassihi,133 discussed
in the Introduction. Fassihi, while a director of Item Software, encouraged
Dehghani, Item Software’s managing director, to negotiate very aggressively
with Isograph. Like Iago, Fassihi had an ulterior motive: to sabotage these
negotiations in order to swoop in and obtain Isograph’s business for Fassihi’s
own (future) company. The trial court found that Fassihi’s advice was
colorable; Fassihi, like Iago, counseled his compatriot down a “parallel
course, directly to his good.” In any event, Fassihi’s advice did not influence
Dehghani’s conduct. Yet the Fassihi Court upheld the trial court’s finding
that Fassihi’s efforts did not violate his duty of loyalty toward Item Software.
Rather, Fassihi was liable for violating his fiduciary “duty to confess” by
“failing to disclose his intention and attempt to compete with” Item
Software.134 The Fassihi Court took a circuitous strategy because the
fiduciary’s conscientiousness was evaluated as part of an implementing rule
(namely, the “duty to confess”), rather than as part of the duty of loyalty
itself.
The postulation of a fiduciary “duty to confess” has made the Fassihi
decision controversial.135 The decision in Fassihi might have been justified
131. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
132. Sitkoff, supra note 32, at 202. Under this standard, the duty of good faith, the duty of honesty,
the duty of fidelity, the duty to confess, the “fraud on a power” doctrine, and the “proper purposes”
doctrine might all be classified as implementing rules.
133. Item Software (UK) Ltd. V. Fassihi [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244 (Eng.).
134. Ho & Lee, supra note 120, at 350.
135. Brandeaux Advisers (UK) Ltd. v Chadwick [2010] EWHC (QB) 3241 [47]; P & V Indus. Pty.,
Ltd. v. Porto, [2006] V.S.C. 131 [23], [42].
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more straightforwardly on the grounds that Fassihi’s efforts violated the
“fundamental duty to which a director is subject, that is the duty to act in
what he in good faith considers to be the best interests of the company.”136
In other words, the Fassihi Court could have ruled (consistent with P3) that
Fassihi’s unsuccessful attempt to usurp business from Item Software by
recommending harsh negotiating tactics against Isograph was a breach of
loyalty, even though (consistent with P4) Fassihi’s actual recommendation
for this course of advice would not have violated his fiduciary duty if it had
been motivated to advance the interests of Item Software.
We do not mean to champion either the direct or circuitous routes for
evaluating the conscientiousness of fiduciaries. Under either strategy,
whether the fiduciary has lived up to her duty depends not only on how she
behaves and deliberates, but also on how that behavior and deliberation fit
together. On either strategy, P4 is best explained in terms of a fiduciary’s
conscientiousness. The double agent and the saboteur violate their fiduciary
duty because the structure of their motivation is inappropriate. The former
acts to serve another master, while the latter acts to subvert the beneficiary.
This argument leaves open an important question. If a fiduciary lacks
conscientiousness when she acts for inappropriate reasons, then what are
appropriate reasons for a fiduciary to act? An unsatisfying (Potter Stewartesque) response is that one needn’t articulate the parameters of the right kind
of reasons for action in order to prove that actions for the wrong kind of
reasons are problematic. In any event, courts typically define the right kinds
of reasons for action broadly, for example in terms of “good faith” or “honest
efforts to advance the beneficiary’s interest.” This broad definition might be
justified by the institutional limits to discerning a fiduciary’s motives, as well
as from concern with inhibiting the discretion or flexibility of the fiduciary.
The conscientiousness norm operates whatever shape the implementing rules
take.
What of a fiduciary who has animosity towards his beneficiary? As
discussed above in connection with Commonwealth v. Washington, hating a
beneficiary seems reconcilable with acting in good faith to advance their
interests. Animosity would matter only when it exerts motivational force.
That said, evidence of sabotage is difficult to detect, especially after the fact.
Many discretionary actions are open to multiple interpretations, some of
which are consistent with fiduciary loyalty and others of which are not. A
lawyer’s failure to investigate a potential alibi witness might be a strategic
decision, or it might be a way for the lawyer to ensure that a reviled client
136.

Fassihi, [2004] EWCA (Civ), at [41].
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gets what he deserves. Therefore, even though a fiduciary’s hatred of the
beneficiary is insufficient to establish a violation of fiduciary loyalty, it is a
good place to look for evidence of sabotage, which does violate fiduciary
loyalty.
What of a fiduciary whose posture resembles what Harry Frankfurt
called wantonness, a complete ambivalence for the interests or ends of the
beneficiary?137 Although genuine wantonness is difficult to find in the world,
such a thoroughgoing disregard would seem to violate fiduciary loyalty.
Consider the Restatement (Third) of Agency’s discussion of the “General
Fiduciary Principle” in section 8.01.138 Comment (b) posits that “[w]hen an
agent’s agreement with a principal confers discretion on the agent to take
action in the agent’s sole discretion, the agent has a duty to exercise the
discretion in good faith,” regardless of whether the agreement specifies such
a duty.139 As an example, the Restatement contemplates a scenario in which
a fiduciary exercises discretionary authority by “flipping a coin,” rather than
seeking out information most relevant to the decision. Such an action would
violate the fiduciary’s duty to act in good faith, even though the agent would
have satisfied this obligation by acting in the same way after “making an
honest attempt to make an informed decision” about how to act.140
Another example of wantonness as a violation of fiduciary loyalty arises
in Delaware corporate law. As Delaware judge Leo Strine and his co-authors
put it, “good faith has long been used as the key element in defining the state
of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary.”141 A Delaware corporation
may not waive damages for actions that are taken “not in good faith.”142 And
as the Delaware Supreme Court has held, the “failure to act in good faith
may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a’ . . .
condition ‘of the . . . duty of loyalty.’”143 The notion of good faith under
137. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 11 (1971).
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
139. Id. § 8.01 cmt. b.
140. Id. (citing Greenwood v. Koven, 880 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), which hypothesizes that
an auctioneer’s decision about whether to rescind a sale made by a coin-toss was paradigmatic case of an
action taken in bad faith). Of course, many fiduciary duties arise in relationships that also involve
contractual duties. Wantonness might violate not only a fiduciary duty, but also specific contractual duties
(like the duty of good faith). See Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The NonContractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 209,
209–10 (2014). Yet in such relationships, fiduciary loyalty is not superfluous to a contractual duty of
good faith; rather, fiduciary loyalty picks out a range of behaviors and motivations that would not
(obviously or directly) be condemned by contract law alone. We discuss this issue more extensively in
Galoob & Leib, supra note 32, at 128–29.
141. Strine et al., supra note 5, at 633.
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
143. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
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Delaware law works not only to target those (like the saboteur) who are
“motivated by a dishonest purpose or ill will towards the corporation and/or
its shareholders,” but also two other defective motivational arrangements:
fiduciaries acting for “(1) a purpose other than advancing the best interests
of the corporation; or [their] (2) intentional disregard of [their] fiduciary
duties to the corporation.”144
Some of the legal standards for assessing the duty of good faith arose
from litigation surrounding the severance pay that the Walt Disney Company
negotiated with its outgoing CEO Michael Ovitz. Shareholders argued that,
when deciding on Ovitz’s contract, the board was not acting in the best
interests of the corporation so much as doing a favor for Michael Eisner, the
CEO who hired Ovitz.145 In Disney, the relevant directors were not accused
of having proscribed conflicts of interest, but were instead alleged to have
been bad faith stewards of the corporation’s best interests.146 At issue,
however, was not “classic” or “subjective bad faith” requiring ill will or
intent to do harm.147 Rather, the bad faith involved was the directors’
“intentionally act[ing] with a purpose other than that of advancing the best
interest of the corporation.”148 The court found it actionable as a breach of
fiduciary duty when directors “adopt[] a ‘we don’t care about the risks’
attitude.”149 When directors make “material decisions without adequate
information and without adequate deliberation,”150 they are in derogation of
their fiduciary obligation. To be sure, the legal elaboration of the duty of
good faith under Delaware corporate law is highly complex.151 Yet the
144. Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. CIN. L.
REV. 859, 863 (2015) (emphasis removed).
145. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 760 (Del. Ch. 2005) (Disney III).
146. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1781 (2007) (emphasizing that the claim in Disney was not that the board
was conflicted but that it was “simply rubber-stamping” Eisner’s proposals).
147. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006) (Disney IV); see also
Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director’s Duty of Care a “Fiduciary” Duty? Does It Mattter?,
48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1027, 1047 (2013) (“[G]ood faith is fundamentally about state of mind—the
quality of a director’s intentions vis-à-vis the company.”).
148. Leahy, supra note 144, at 867. Fiduciary loyalty also prohibits a director from acting for
“greed, hatred, lust, envy, revenge . . . shame or pride.” Disney III, 907 A.2d at 754 (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
149. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Disney II).
150. Id.
151. For the purposes of our argument, it does not matter how much “good faith” or “bad faith” in
corporate law is meant to be evaluated objectively or subjectively. Compare Strine et al., supra note 4, at
655 (arguing for a subjective understanding), with Melvin E. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in
Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006) (advocating a more objective approach). Nor does it matter
whether the duty of good faith should be subsumed under the duty of loyalty. Nor does it matter whether
the duty of loyalty is disclaimable or how infrequently Delaware courts have upheld claims of bad faith.
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Disney Court’s “we don’t care about the risks” standard identifies the same
wantonness that is also condemned in the Restatement (Third) of Agency’s
example of coin flipping. In both cases, the (hypothesized) motivational
posture violates the conscientiousness that fiduciary loyalty requires.
To summarize, a cognitivist account of fiduciary loyalty can explain
why a fiduciary’s motivation matters to the performance of her fiduciary
duties, either directly through appraisal in terms of a duty of loyalty or more
circuitously through appraisal in terms of some implementing rule or
doctrine, such as the duty to confess or—perhaps—the duty of good faith.
Cognitivism can also begin to explain which motivations are inappropriate:
sabotage definitely, wantonness probably, and hatred only insofar as it
motivates actions that are inconsistent with the beneficiary’s interests or
ends.
On the other hand, P4 is difficult to reconcile with either the
contractarian or proscriptivist positions. Extant versions of both views define
loyalty solely in terms of how a fiduciary behaves. Thus, both views would
deny that the sorts of motivational considerations described in P4 are
relevant to assessing whether a fiduciary has violated the duty of loyalty.
The contractarian might further respond to our critique by denying that
P4 is analytically distinct—that is, by asserting that each of our examples of
conscientiousness can be accounted for by positing that a distinctive
motivational component to fiduciary loyalty would have been bargained for
ex ante. For example, the contractarian rules out the fiduciary saboteur from
a hypothetical bargaining perspective. The hidden saboteur who plans from
the outset of the fiduciary relationship to undermine the beneficiary’s
interests could be said to commit promissory fraud.152 Yet the saboteur
whose effort to undermine arises only after the commencement of the
fiduciary relationship could not be ruled out from this ex ante perspective.
Thus, the contractarian position could conclude that the hidden saboteur
violates his fiduciary duties only at the cost of denying that the subsequent
saboteur does so as well. Yet there seems to be no meaningful difference
between the loyalty of the hidden saboteur and the loyalty of the subsequent
saboteur. Nor is there any principled basis for a legal system to treat these
cases differently.
See Leahy, supra note 144, at 875–76, 880–82. Rather, Delaware courts’ explanations of the standards
for fiduciary faithfulness indicate, consistent with P4, that some motivational structures are inconsistent
with fiduciary obligation, which is enough to show that P4 is part of fiduciary law.
152. See IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED
INTENT 96–97 (2005) (contending that “blank promises,” in which one party intends at the time of
agreement not to act in the way that he or she promises, lack mutual value).
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Likewise, contractarianism might rule out the wanton fiduciary on the
grounds that some sort of performance standard would be agreed on as part
of a hypothetical bargain between the fiduciary and beneficiary. To the
extent that the wanton falls short of this performance standard, he violates
his fiduciary duty toward the beneficiary. Yet this contractarian strategy
would have difficulty distinguishing wanton inaction—for example, inaction
as a matter of course—from prudent inaction—for example, inaction based
on a strategic calculation that it is the best option for advancing the
beneficiary’s interests. In contrast to the hidden and subsequent saboteurs,
the difference between wanton and prudent inaction does seem meaningful.
There is very good reason for a legal system to treat these two cases
differently. Yet due to its behaviorist assumptions, contractarianism could
not readily explain this disparity.
Proscriptivism has similar difficulties explaining the defectiveness of
both the saboteur and the wanton fiduciary, although an advocate of this
position might concede that both cases violate fiduciary loyalty.153 Neither
the saboteur nor the wanton serve another master, so neither runs afoul of the
no-conflict rule. Further, by hypothesis, neither the saboteur nor the wanton
derives any inappropriate profit from the fiduciary relationship. If these rules
exhaust the content of fiduciary loyalty, then proscriptivism must deny that
either case constitutes a violation of fiduciary loyalty. This conclusion is not
only normatively indefensible, but also contrary to existing fiduciary law.154
P5. The insensitivity or flimsiness of a fiduciary’s commitment to the
beneficiary’s interests or ends can constitute a violation of fiduciary
loyalty.
The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty encompasses more than how she
happens to behave and deliberate, and more than whether she happens to act
for the right kinds of reasons. Fiduciary duties automatically impose
demands that are more robust than the default duties imposed by other types
153. See, e.g., Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393, 397 n.15 (2007) (“[W]hat may appear to be low effort may actually be the result of sabotage by
another agent (e.g., at a bottleneck point) attempting to mask relative effort. In that instance, the
sabotaging agent commits the fiduciary breach.”). For the reasons described above, Flannigan’s
conclusion cannot be reconciled with his embrace of proscriptivism.
154. Perhaps, the proscriptivist might contend, the saboteur and the wanton violate a duty to the
beneficiary, but not a fiduciary duty. On an alternative reading of the proscriptivist position, one might
see the saboteur and the wanton as violating (nominate) duties of care, rather than duties of fiduciary
loyalty. However, this solution does not resolve the normative or descriptive gaps in proscriptivism. For
one thing, it is not clear that the saboteur or the wanton violates an objective duty of care; in the Fassihi
case, for example, Fassihi’s advice would satisfy an objective duty of care, and yet it still violated a
fiduciary duty owed to the entity.
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of legal norms. A fiduciary must exhibit a special sensitivity towards and a
sturdy commitment to the interests or ends of the beneficiary. Fiduciary
loyalty can be violated when a fiduciary is insensitive to the beneficiary’s
interests or ends or when the fiduciary’s commitment to these interests or
ends is too contingent.
First, fiduciary loyalty requires the fiduciary to be sensitive to the
interests or ends of the beneficiary.155 The sensitivity we have in mind here
resembles an epistemic notion of sensitivity, according to which someone’s
belief in a proposition is sensitive only if he would not have believed that
proposition if the proposition had been false.156 Consider the example of a
non-functioning grandfather clock whose hands are stopped at 8:00. The
clock’s reading is correct twice a day. It does not follow that someone
observing the broken clock at 8:00 PM knows what time it is. One
explanation for why not is that the clock is an insensitive mechanism. The
clock’s reading does not ground knowledge, even when it is correct, because
if the time had been different, the clock still would have read 8:00. Thus,
sensitivity acts as a counterfactual constraint on true belief: the clock’s
epistemic defects exist at both 7:00 PM and at 8:00 PM.
Courts often invoke the notion of insensitivity to explain why a
fiduciary’s actions breach his or her duty of loyalty.157 However, the parallel
with epistemic sensitivity allows for a more precise articulation of the term
in legal settings. In the same way that the requirements for accurate time
telling vary based on changes in the external world, so too do the
requirements on fiduciaries change based on changes to the situation of the
beneficiary.
Some characterize these changes in terms of the open-endedness of
155. Elsewhere, we have argued that sensitivity is a component of ordinary loyalty as well. See Leib
& Galoob, supra note 61, at 1843.
156. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 179 (1981); Fred I. Dretske, Epistemic
Operators, 67 J. PHIL. 1007 passim (1970). See generally SHERRILYN ROUSH, TRACKING TRUTH:
KNOWLEDGE, EVIDENCE, AND SCIENCE (2005); Keith DeRose, Insensitivity Is Back, Baby!, 24 PHIL.
PERSPECTIVES 161 (2010); David Enoch & Talia Fisher, Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and
Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 STAN. L. REV. 557 (2015).
157. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court found that a trustee bank violated its duty of loyalty
based on “insensitivity . . . in the performance of its duty of loyalty to the trust’s beneficiaries” by retaining
the trustee bank’s own stock in the trust. First Ala. Bank of Huntsville, N.A. v. Spragins, 515 So. 2d 962,
964 (Ala. 1987). Similarly, in cases involving professional discipline of a lawyer for violation of
applicable rules of professional conduct, courts often distinguish the lawyer’s insensitivity to fiduciary
duty as a basis for finding a breach of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., In re Evans, 578 A.2d 1141, 1151 (D.C.
1990); In re Lupo, 851 N.E.2d 404, 414 (Mass. 2006); Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 926 (Or. Ct.
App. 1989).
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fiduciary duties.158 We have described this phenomenon in terms of
“morphing”—the requirements applicable to a fiduciary change
automatically based on changes to the interests or ends of the beneficiary.159
On either formulation, fiduciary loyalty can be violated by a fiduciary’s
failure to monitor relevant changes to the interests or ends of the
beneficiary.160 For example, in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery found that director-fiduciaries
must monitor the ongoing operations of a company and must “exercise
appropriate attention” to what is going on within the corporation in order to
fulfill their duty of loyalty.161 Thus, the duty of loyalty can also be violated
by a fiduciary’s failure to update his understanding of his responsibilities that
apply to him based on such changes, or by a failure to revise his course of
action based on the changes to the beneficiary’s interests or ends.162
Moreover, as with epistemic insensitivity, there can be purely counterfactual
violations of fiduciary duties—that is, violations of fiduciary loyalty based
on defects of performance that are based on features that are not realized in
the actual world but that would have been realized in close possible
worlds.163 This possibility is contemplated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
158. E.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55,
75–76 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985). See generally MARKOVITS, supra note 140.
159. See Leib & Galoob, supra note 61, at 1843–44.
160. See, e.g., Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alts. Inc.), 385 B.R. 586, 591–92
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (finding a failure to monitor claim cognizable as a breach of fiduciary duty).
161. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 967, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). A critic might note the extreme
burdens to grounding liability for corporate directors solely on Caremark factors. Id. at 967 (“The theory
here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope
to win a judgment.”). Our main contention here, however, is that Caremark’s monitoring duty is a
component of the duty of loyalty, regardless of whether or how the duty to monitor figures into litigation
strategies or standards of review.
162. See FDIC ex rel. Wheatland Bank v. Spangler, 836 F. Supp.2d 778, 792 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(refusing to allow the business judgment rule to insulate defendants who “disregarded regulatory
warnings of unsafe lending practices and monthly reports reflecting dangerous loan concentration and
excessive growth . . . and took no action to reform underwriting practices in response to criticism.”).
163. An example here might be possible conflicts of interest in trust law—not actual conflicts but
the mere “possibility of conflict.” See Penner, supra note 29, at 168 (citing Keech v. Sandford, 2 Eq. Cas.
Ab. 741, Cas. Ch. 61, 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (1726)). A similar set of considerations apply to positional
conflicts of interest of lawyers, which “occur[] when a law firm adopts a legal position for one client
seeking a particular legal result that is directly contrary to the position taken on behalf of another present
or former client, seeking an opposite legal result, in a completely unrelated matter.” John S. Dzienkowski,
Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 460 (1993). Positional conflicts are problematic
when
there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s action on behalf of one client will materially limit the
lawyer’s effectiveness in representing another client in a different case; for example, when a
decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken
on behalf of the other client. . . . If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent
informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or
withdraw from one or both matters.
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interpretation of a conflict-of-interest statute as being “more concerned with
what might have happened in a given situation than with what actually
happened.”164 These requirements of sensitivity are best seen as implications
of fiduciary loyalty, even if courts do not always classify all of them in this
language.
A second aspect of the robustness of fiduciary duties is that they can be
violated when a fiduciary’s commitment to the beneficiary is too flimsy or
contingent. There is a modal constraint on the fiduciary duty of loyalty. For
example, while the fiduciary need not stick with the beneficiary through
thick and thin, he may not simply leave the beneficiary in order to pursue a
more lucrative relationship. The flimsiness of the fiduciary’s commitment to
the beneficiary can therefore constitute a violation of the duty of loyalty.165
The so-called “hot potato” doctrine in the field of professional
responsibility166 illustrates how sturdiness is an aspect of fiduciary loyalty.
Suppose that Alice Attorney, a general practitioner, represents Claude Client
on a routine estate planning matter. Pete Patron retains Alice for a potentially
lucrative tort suit against number of defendants, including Claude. The
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) prevent an
attorney from representing one client when that representation will be
“directly adverse to another client,” even if (as in our scenario) the
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt 24 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). In other words, a positional
conflict can violate a lawyer’s duty of loyalty on the grounds that it might harm the client’s interest or
inhibit the lawyer’s representation of the client, regardless of whether the conflict has or actually does
have these effects.
164. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549–50 (1961) (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., Dana A. Remus, Reconstructing Professionalism, 51 GA. L. REV. 807, 856 (2017)
(“The value of a lawyer’s loyalty is often expressed from the perspective of the client: [It] . . . ensures
that a lawyer will not abandon a client as soon as a more lucrative opportunity arises.”). The possibility
that a flimsy commitment can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty does not imply that fiduciary loyalty
is inevitably “maximal,” in the sense that George Fletcher uses that term, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 61–77 (1995), or what Matthew Harding
calls a “thick” form of interpersonal trust, see Harding, supra note 4, at 83. Allowing some form of
contingency in the fiduciary’s commitment to the beneficiary is necessary to make sense of the possibility
that, for example, employees might have fiduciary duties toward employers in an age of at-will
employment. See Matthew I. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 847–54
(2016); Marian Riedy & Kim Sperduto, At-Will Fiduciaries: The Anomalies of a Duty of Loyalty in the
Twenty-First Century, 93 NEB. L. REV. 267, 272–79 (2014). Our point is not that the requisite sturdiness
is uniform across fiduciary relationships; rather, in contexts where fiduciary duties arise, some kinds of
flimsy commitments would be sufficient to constitute a violation of fiduciary duty. For example, even
among at-will employees, an untriggered, secret plan to betray would constitute a breach of fiduciary
loyalty. Such a violation of fiduciary loyalty might be appraised either in terms of planned treachery
(which runs afoul of P3) or in terms of the flimsiness of commitment that is evinced by such a plan (which
runs afoul of P5).
166. See generally John Leubsdorf, Conflicts of Interest: Slicing the Hot Potato Doctrine, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 251 (2011).
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representation of one client is substantially unrelated to the representation of
the other, unless both clients consent.167 On the current-client conflict rule,
then, Alice could not represent Pete in the tort suit unless Claude consented
to the representation. However, a more lenient rule applies to suits against a
former client: so long as the lawyer’s representation of the current client is
not substantially related to the lawyer’s representation of the former client,
the lawyer may represent the current client even if the former client does not
consent to the arrangement.168 On this former-client conflict rule, then, Alice
could represent Pete in the tort suit without needing Claude’s consent if
Claude were Alice’s former (rather than current) client. Finally, the Model
Rules provide wide latitude for terminating the representation of a client: a
lawyer may conclude a representation for any reason, so long as the
termination of a representation does not have a “material adverse effect” on
the interests of a client.169 The intersection of all three of these rules suggests
that Alice could obviate the need for Claude’s consent to her representation
of Pete in the tort suit by dropping Claude “like a hot potato”170—that is, by
terminating her representation of Claude and thereby converting a currentclient conflict into a former-client conflict.
Many courts resolve these “hot potato” scenarios by prohibiting the
lawyer from “firing” the current client in order to represent the more
lucrative client, even though this move (however unseemly) is licit under the
professional conduct rules. This restriction is typically justified in terms of
the lawyer’s overarching duty of loyalty to the client. Although the language
of many opinions in these cases is phrased in terms of “undivided loyalty,”
the most relevant factors cited by courts concern the flimsiness of the
lawyer’s commitment to the less-remunerative client. For example, one court
argued that a lawyer’s termination of a relationship only triggers the formerclient conflict rule if “the lawyer’s primary motivation for terminating” the
representation “was not his desire to represent” a new, more lucrative
client.171
A cognitivist account can straightforwardly explain why both
insensitivity and flimsiness violate fiduciary loyalty. Insensitivity is
167. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
168. Id. at r. 1.9(a).
169. Id. at r. 1.16(b)(1).
170. Picker Int’l., Inc. v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987); see also
Ex parte AmSouth Bank, N.A., 589 So. 2d 715, 721–22 (Ala. 1991) (“[A] law firm should not be allowed
to abandon its absolute duty of loyalty to one of its clients so that it can benefit from a conflict of interest
that it has created.”).
171. ValuePart, Inc. v. Clements, No. 06 C 2709, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98167, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 2, 2006).
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problematic, regardless of whether it leads to problematic results, because it
violates an independent requirement of fiduciary loyalty. The flimsiness of
a fiduciary’s commitment is also problematic, independent of performance,
because it suggests a similar defect regarding these considerations.
On the other hand, contractarian accounts cannot explain why
insensitivity is problematic. As noted above, extant versions of
contractarianism define loyalty in terms of behavior and expected results.
Although contractarianism might deem insensitivity to be problematic
insofar as it leads a fiduciary to engage in problematic behavior or produce
substandard results, it cannot constitute a violation of fiduciary loyalty on its
own. Yet P5 contemplates that insensitivity is sufficient to violate fiduciary
loyalty. Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile a modal constraint like
insensitivity within the contractarian framework. In contract law, unrealized
contingencies do not typically constitute breaches of contractual duty. From
the perspective of an ex ante bargain, such contingencies might be seen as
priced into the bargain. Therefore, a contractarian couldn’t easily explain
why purely counterfactual considerations (like unrealized but “possible”
conflicts of interest) could constitute a breach of a contractual duty. Yet the
insight behind insensitivity is that purely counterfactual considerations can
be sufficient to constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Proscriptivism faces similar challenges accounting for P5. Mere
insensitivity cannot violate a fiduciary duty if no explicit fiduciary rule
requires sensitivity or prohibits insensitivity. Proscriptivism cannot explain
why the flimsiness of a commitment might run afoul of fiduciary duties,
since the relevant proscriptions are framed in terms of actual events rather
than in terms of modal operators.
***
Our case for cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty has been both
empirical and interpretive, albeit largely indirect. A cognitivist account of
fiduciary loyalty provides a unified explanation for all of the legal
propositions we have identified in this Part. Accounts of fiduciary law that
deny cognitivism—for example, contractarian and proscriptivist
approaches—might be able to explain some of these legal propositions, but
they fail to provide a unified explanation for all of them. Moreover, the
explanations offered by contractarianism and proscriptivism are ad hoc,
perhaps due to the implicit commitment of these views to assess fiduciary
loyalty entirely in terms of behavior. The best interpretation of fiduciary law,
then, is that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive dimension.
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III. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
This Part articulates and responds to several concerns about cognitivism
regarding fiduciary loyalty. These responses both summarize our
conclusions and highlight some important implications of our analysis.
A. DOES COGNITIVISM ACTUALLY RESOLVE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
MORALISM AND AMORALISM?
Our initial inquiry was framed in terms of the seeming impasse between
moralist and amoralist accounts of fiduciary loyalty. Appreciating the
cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty does not fully resolve the debate
between moralism and amoralism. Indeed, many of the most pressing
questions in this debate remain disputable. For example, cognitivism has
little to say about the disclaimability of fiduciary obligation. Nor does it yield
any clean insights about important questions such as whether ordinary moral
considerations are relevant to understanding fiduciary liability or remedies
for breach of fiduciary duties. Rather, we see cognitivism as a potential
common ground for moralist and amoralist positions.
To be sure, we are not wholly agnostic between the moralist and
amoralist positions. On our definition, a moralist account holds that fiduciary
loyalty references at least some aspects of the ordinary notion of loyalty. If,
as we argued in Section II.A, ordinary loyalty has a cognitive dimension,
then cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty could entail a weak form of
moralism: that at least one aspect of ordinary loyalty (namely, its cognitive
dimension) applies directly to fiduciary loyalty. (We leave open whether
other structural features of the ordinary concept of loyalty might illuminate
fiduciary loyalty.) No stronger form of moralism follows from cognitivism,
however. It is possible to accept that fiduciary loyalty has a cognitive
dimension while denying, for example, that the ultimate justification for
fiduciary and ordinary loyalty are identical, or that ordinary moral
considerations inform the appropriate remedies for violations of fiduciary
loyalty. Furthermore, the kinds of deliberation, conscientiousness, and
sensitivity appropriate for fiduciaries almost certainly diverge from the
requirements as they apply to loyal friends, lovers, and compatriots. Indeed,
the minimal standards of deliberation, conscientiousness, and robustness are
likely to vary significantly across fiduciary contexts. If so, then the structural
requirements of loyalty are unlikely to be identical across moral life and
fiduciary types. Ultimately, amoralists can embrace cognitivism about
fiduciary loyalty as an explanation for the legal propositions identified in
Section II.B, since none of these propositions directly invokes the “ordinary”
notion of loyalty.
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Appreciating the cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty, then, does
not fully resolve the debate between moralism and amoralism. And both
sides in this debate might find our analysis unsatisfying. The amoralist might
find our conclusion distasteful because it points to some substantial structural
similarity between fiduciary loyalty and ordinary loyalty. On the other hand,
the moralist might see our conclusion as too concessive, since it admits the
possibility of explicating large swaths of fiduciary law in purely
conventional or institutional terms. We see this lack of resolution as
appealing, rather than problematic. Accepting that fiduciary loyalty has a
cognitive dimension still leaves open many interesting theoretical questions
about fiduciary law. Yet the common ground provided by cognitivism
provides a new basis for addressing policy and design questions regarding
fiduciary law generally, and corporate law, trust law, and the law governing
lawyers, in particular.
For example, cognitivism has implications for debates about the
applicability of fiduciary duties to investment advisers and brokers. An
investment adviser engages “primarily in advisory activities, including
portfolio selection, asset allocation, portfolio management, selecting and
monitoring other advisers, and financial planning.”172 A broker provides
investment advice to an investor, while also “executing trades, selling
securities, lending money to investors to invest on margin, [and] maintaining
custody of funds and securities.”173 As a matter of U.S. law, investment
advisers have long been held to operate under “federal fiduciary standards,”
including affirmative duties of good faith and care.174 Recent legal
developments have also applied a “fiduciary standard” to actions by brokers,
although this application is more contested.175 The controversy surrounding
172. Arthur R. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should Be
Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 710 (2012).
173. Id. at 709–10.
174. Several U.S. Supreme Court opinions have found that the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
creates fiduciary duty for advisers. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–80 (1977); SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 181–82 (1963). Although this legal question is
settled, there is a dispute among scholars of fiduciary law about whether fiduciary duties should apply to
financial advisers. For example, Paul Miller, one of the preeminent theorists of fiduciary law, contends
that financial advisers do not have the kind of discretionary authority that grounds fiduciary duties. On
Miller’s “fiduciary powers” view, advisers “are not fiduciaries . . . by virtue of giving advice. Instead,
they are fiduciaries only where they exercise discretionary power over the practical interests of their
clients. In such cases, provision of advice is incidental to the exercise of discretionary power.” Paul
Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 3,
at 63, 84.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Szur, 289
F.3d 200, 211 (2d Cir. 2002); Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3
F.3d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 1993); MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 886
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the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Fiduciary Rule176 is, in the main, about
whether both investment advisers and broker-dealers should be subject to
fiduciary standards.177
Cognitivism can support those who argue for the application of
fiduciary duties to investment managers and brokers, as well as those who
support the DOL Fiduciary Rule. Investment advice invites the possibility of
betrayal generally, as well as concerns with each of the cognitive elements
of loyalty that we have identified above. The client of an investment manager
or broker has reason to be concerned with potential defects in the
deliberation, conscientiousness, or commitment of an investment adviser,
regardless of how the adviser actually behaves (that is, independently of the
content of the advice that she provides).178 Broker-client relationships
implicate all of the same concerns with cognition that arise in the advicegiving context, while also inviting the possibility of betrayal in the context
of a broker’s acting on behalf of clients in the purchase of securities for their
accounts. All of these concerns with betrayal apply regardless of whether the
broker has a recognized conflict of interest and independently of an objective
assessment of the broker’s advice or behavior. Therefore, a cognitivist
understanding of fiduciary loyalty can be marshaled to hold advisers and
brokers to fiduciary standards.
A further question concerns whether fiduciary duties should apply to
so-called “robo-advisers,” automated services that provide financial advice
(usually concerning investment, but sometimes about insurance and
banking) to clients on the basis of algorithms.179 Here, too, cognitivism
F.2d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 1989).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–.21 (218). On May 22, 2017, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2017-02, providing temporary non-enforcement of the new fiduciary rules.
177. See generally The DOL Fiduciary Rule Explained, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.investopedia.com/updates/dol-fiduciary-rule (explaining the history and status of the DOL’s
rule). The courts have not been univocal on whether the rule is valid. Compare Market Synergy Grp., Inc.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 676, 685–86 (10th Cir. 2018) (upholding the rule), with Chamber of
Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2018) (invalidating the rule).
178. E.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711–12 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that advisers to a duty of
investigation about the advice they peddle).
179. See, e.g., SCOTT MACKILLOP, FIRST ASCENT ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, CAN A ROBOT BE A
FIDUCIARY? 3–5 (2016), http://firstascentam.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/FA-Position-Paper-CanRobot-Be-Fiduciary_FINAL.pdf; Nicole G. Iannarone, Computer as Confidant: Digital Investment
Advice and the Fiduciary Standard, CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 156–60 (2018); Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots
Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisers Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1543, 1563–71 (2018); Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisers: A Closer Look, SSRN (June 30, 2015),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2658701; Robert Powell, Can a Robo Adviser Really Act in Your Best Interest?,
MARKETWATCH (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/can-a-robo-adviser-really-act-inyour-best-interest-2016-04-28.
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provides support to those who favor applying fiduciary duties. However, this
support is more contingent. A cognitivist might contend that fiduciary duties
should apply to the extent that algorithms invite the possibility of betrayal—
in particular, betrayal by the humans who formulate, market, or implement
the algorithm. For example, an algorithm programmed to favor investment
vehicles that promote the adviser’s products over superior products from
other firms would seem to violate the duty of loyalty. As Baker and Dellaert
note, “the human/machine handoff provides significant opportunities to take
advantage of consumers . . . .”180
However, cognitivism suggests that different standards might apply to
so-called “black-box” algorithms, which utilize “opaque computational
models to make decisions” about what to advise or implement.181 Such
models are “non-transparent,” in that the “relationships they capture cannot
be explicitly understood” by either customers or programmers “and
sometimes cannot even be explicitly stated.”182 While “black-box” roboadvisers might be evaluated in terms of the quality of their advice, they do
not seem to invite the same possibilities of betrayal as human-based (or
human-algorithm coordinated) investment management. As such,
cognitivism does not clearly provide additional support for applying
fiduciary duties to “black box” robo-advisers, although other kinds of
considerations might support the application of fiduciary duties in
connection with these products.183
Our goal here is not to definitively resolve these ongoing debates about
fiduciary duties. However, our analysis might be utilized in these debates.
Cognitivism not only helps to explicate what responsibilities fiduciaries
have, but also supports arguments about when specific legal relationships are
or should be governed by fiduciary duties.
B. IS COGNITIVISM A CONCEPTUAL CLAIM ABOUT THE NATURE OF
FIDUCIARY LOYALTY?
Our conclusions about cognitivism are not only empirical and
interpretive. They are also normative—that is, they offer a specific vision
180. Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advisers Across the Financial Services
Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 740 (2018).
181. W. Nicholson Price, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421 (2015).
182. Id.
183. To wit, since we might want the programmer writing the code for the “black box”—or the
salesperson selling the code—to have a proper commitment to the interests of the end-user, there still
may be sense in applying fiduciary obligations upstream from the “black box.” We also cannot rule out
the possibility that the “black box” itself could engage in undetectable betrayal.
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about what fiduciary law ought to be. However, our conclusions are not
conceptual. We do not claim that cognitivism is a necessary truth about
fiduciary law.
As demonstrated in Section II.B, the cognitive dimension of fiduciary
loyalty is part of fiduciary law across legal contexts in a variety of
jurisdictions. The normative costs of denying cognitivism would likely be
steep. The tenets of cognitivism are consistent with the intuitive
understanding of ordinary loyalty, and they are part of many fiduciaries’ selfunderstanding. Moreover, the costs of rejecting cognitivism exceed the
normal drawbacks of defining legal terms in technical ways that deviate from
common sense and positive law. A non-cognitivist fiduciary loyalty would
have difficulty explaining why the saboteur or the schemer has breached her
fiduciary duty. More broadly, a non-cognitivist understanding of fiduciary
loyalty would subject beneficiaries to the kinds of predation and exploitation
that fiduciary duties generally are supposed to prevent. Whatever the
ultimate goals of fiduciary law are, they are likely better served by attributing
at least some cognitive dimension to fiduciary loyalty.
However, just because it would be unwise for a legal system to deny the
cognitive dimension of fiduciary loyalty does not mean that doing so is
impossible. Although cognitivism is part of fiduciary law in the jurisdictions
and legal contexts we have examined, it is logically possible for a jurisdiction
to define fiduciary loyalty entirely in non-cognitive terms. It is an intelligible
position that fiduciary loyalty is entirely a matter of how the fiduciary
behaves and/or what results from his actions. Our case for cognitivism does
not rise to the level of a Fullerian claim about the internal morality of law.
In a legal system genuinely concerned with limiting opportunism and
predation, it would be unwise, but not incoherent, to reject cognitivism. Nor
do we deny that there might be some advantages to such a non-cognitivist
understanding of fiduciary loyalty.184 These benefits, however, would likely
not outweigh the costs of rejecting cognitivism. In any event, such a legal
system would be very different from any that we have observed.185
184. A non-cognitivist interpretation of fiduciary loyalty would be much easier to administer than
one that inquired about the fiduciary’s deliberation and/or motivation, not to mention the robustness of
her commitment to the beneficiary. Furthermore, a purely behavioral definition of loyalty would provide
the kind of clear guidelines that appeal to Holmes’s “bad man.” Therefore, to the extent that fiduciaries
in a legal domain more closely resemble the Holmesian bad man, a non-cognitivist interpretation of
fiduciary loyalty might be justified in terms of efficiency (for example, as reducing transaction,
information, enforcement, and error costs).
185. A version of amoralism about fiduciary loyalty based solely on normative arguments (for
example, the one advocated by Easterbrook and Fischel) might dispute whether a cognitivist account of
fiduciary loyalty is ultimately justified. Our empirical claim that extant fiduciary law implicates cognitive
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C. CAN COGNITIVISM BE RECONCILED WITH THE SYSTEMATIC
UNDERENFORCEMENT OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES? (OR: IF FIDUCIARY LAW IS
COGNITIVIST, HOW COME IT’S SO LAX?)
In many legal contexts, the enforcement of fiduciary loyalty is relatively
rare.186 This laxity of enforcement is often thought to arise from divergence
between the more exacting standards of conduct and the more forgiving
standards of review. If fiduciaries are only occasionally held to any standard
of loyalty (let alone the rarefied, cognition-based standard that we have
identified here), then is cognitivism a meaningful part of fiduciary law?
To be sure, implementing rules diverge from primary norms in many
other areas besides fiduciary law.187 However, if fiduciary law ignored the
cognitive dimensions of fiduciary loyalty, then saboteurs would be treated
differently than double agents and unsuccessful betrayals would fulfill the
duty of loyalty. Such an arrangement would contradict the propositions of
fiduciary law that we have identified here and run afoul of the norms against
opportunism and predation that seem fundamental to fiduciary law on both
moralist and amoralist views. That said, the systematic underenforcement of
the deliberative, motivational, and robustness aspects of fiduciary loyalty
might be explained in at least two principled ways. Both of these
explanations concede that non-cognitivist accounts of fiduciary loyalty have
some power to describe and shape the institution of fiduciary law. However,
both ultimately vindicate cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty.
One kind of explanation is a version of Meir Dan-Cohen’s “acoustic
separation” thesis, which posits that law speaks simultaneously to multiple
audiences.188 On Dan-Cohen’s formulation, conduct rules speak to those
who are governed by the positive law, while decision rules communicate
information to legal officials. A slightly different separation seems
applicable to fiduciary law. To wit, on Henry Smith’s understanding of
concerns might be appraised as normatively misguided. Perhaps courts lack institutional competence to
appraise cognitive considerations. Perhaps behaviorist and cognitivist approaches can be expected to
produce similar results, but the behaviorist understanding imposes lower expected costs. Our case for
cognitivism does not rule out the possibility of such a normative argument against cognitivism. However,
abandoning cognitivism would enable several forms of abuse and exploitation that fiduciary law is
designed (and uniquely suited) to protect against. Moreover, such a purely normative argument would be
highly revisionist, since it would require denying many (and perhaps all) of the legal propositions
identified in Section II.B.
186. See Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 519, 521–22, 526–27 (2012); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of
Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 passim (1993).
187. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 54, at 722–27.
188. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–34 (1984).
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equity law, fiduciary law might be seen to speak simultaneously to the
Holmesian “bad man” and to the “good person.” If law is construed as
dealing with the good person (one who internalizes a legal norm and its
cognitive implications), then the ambiguity of a legal standard can actually
increase the likelihood that people will adhere to that standard.189 In these
cases, ambiguity about the dictates of a legal standard regarding enforcement
serves to “crowd in” fiduciaries whose prior orientation is toward normadherence.190 For this group, the vague standards of conduct applicable
within extant fiduciary law can be expected to reinforce and promote
deliberation about what to do and about what their fiduciary responsibilities
require.191
For the Holmesian bad man, however, fiduciary law aims to police
opportunism. On the acoustic separation story, “the same literal message”
regarding fiduciary law’s clear proscriptions “can serve as an antievasion
device for bad-faith actors while not interfering with (or even while
promoting) the intrinsic [orientation] [] of the good-faith actors.”192 This
acoustic separation helps reconcile the cognitive dimension of fiduciary
loyalty with the systematic underenforcement of fiduciary duties regarding
deliberation, motivation, and commitment: more aggressive policing of these
dimensions would undercut much of the value of fiduciary loyalty for the
good person. On this strategy, then, we would expect judicial relief only in
the most egregious cases of deliberative, motivational, and commitment
failure.
As discussed in Section II.B, this is the pattern that the cases reveal. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Washington, the contempt exhibited by
Washington’s lawyer might have indicated disloyalty, even though the more
prosaic antipathy that many lawyers sometimes feel toward their clients
would not have provided any evidence of disloyalty. The systematic
underenforcement of cognitive aspects of fiduciary loyalty, then, might
allow fiduciary law to speak to both the good person and the bad man at the
189. Yuval Feldman & Henry E. Smith, Behavioral Equity, 170 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL
ECON. 137, 145 (2014).
190. Id. at 148.
191. Id. at 147 (citing Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional
Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222–25 (2010)). This story is, in broad strokes, consistent with
the explanation for the combination of lax enforcement and widespread compliance in Lynn A. Stout, On
the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other Cultures: Can a Transplant Take?, in
GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN A NEW ERA OF
CROSS-BORDER DEALS 46, 55 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) and Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735,
1754–55, 1782–83, 1785 (2001).
192. Feldman & Smith, supra note 189, at 150.
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same time.
A second, and related, explanatory strategy for lax enforcement is
rooted in what one might call a paradox of loyalty at the center of the
incompatibilist’s insight. Loyalty in life (as in law) requires someone to act
for the right kinds of reasons. If someone is motivated to act solely because
of fear of legal enforcement, then (depending on the context) her
motivational structure might constitute acting for the wrong kind of reason.
Too tightly specifying the rules governing the cooperation and trust between
fiduciary and beneficiary might inhibit the formation of genuine trust.193
Thus, combining lax enforcement policies with the uncertainty generated by
hortatory language (as in Meinhard v. Salmon) establishes legal incentives
that can facilitate the development of intrinsic motivations, even for the bad
man. On this explanation, then, the case for underenforcement is itself
prophylactic: extensive enforcement of the cognitive aspects of fiduciary
loyalty would be self-defeating.
In sum, if cognitivism is true, then the standards for living up to
fiduciary loyalty are often far more demanding than the legal standards of
accountability that courts and officials apply to fiduciaries. However, both
the “acoustic separation” and “self-defeating” stories can explain this
divergence between legal norms and legal enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Loyalty is, at least in part, a matter of cognition: how someone
deliberates, what motivates her, the sturdiness of her commitments. This
cognitive structure to loyalty in the world is as intuitive as it is important. To
disregard the thoughts and plans of Iago and Littlefinger is to understate their
treachery.
The same is true about fiduciary loyalty. Behavior is, of course, the
most important concern of legal rules. However, a purely behavioral
understanding of fiduciary duties is incomplete. Many widely-held legal
propositions are difficult to explain without referencing a fiduciary’s
cognition. Cognitivism about fiduciary loyalty challenges the most
prominent amoralist accounts of fiduciary duties, especially proscriptivism
and contractarianism, which define fiduciary duties solely in terms of how a
fiduciary behaves.
193. See generally Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 159 (2000) (arguing that explicit incentives can “crowd out”
voluntary cooperation and intrinsic motivation).
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Cognitivism does not necessarily resolve the longstanding debate
between moralists and amoralists about fiduciary loyalty, let alone in other
areas of law where similar debates arise.194 Rather, it provides a common
ground from which proponents of both positions might better understand the
central norms of fiduciary law. Both inside the law and out, loyalty makes
demands on the inside of you.
194. For example, a cognitivist approach to contract theory might resemble Daniel Markovits’s
work, which focuses less on the divergence between contract and promise and more on the structural
morphology between the two. See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417,
1473 (2004); see also Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General
Theory of Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 5–8, 18–20 (2005).

